Acts of terror and increased activities in extremist milieus have stressed the need for developing policy to counter violent extremism (CVE) in the Nordic countries. In such policy, multiagency collaboration structures are given a central role in preventing the recruitment of youth to extremism. In this study of Nordic policies developed to counter extremism and prevent crime, we have mapped and compared the organization of multiagency collaboration, the practices that are to be utilized and the legal frameworks that support these approaches. The findings reveal previously unknown discrepancies, similarities and differences between the Nordic countries that can help to inform a sometimes heated and polarized debate on how extremism is handled. By combining discourse analysis and organizational institutional theory, we provide a framework that conceptualizes multiagency collaboration structures as “hybrid spaces” where two different logics – a societal security logic and a social care logic – compete, mix and co-exist. This framework gives some explanation to why multiagency collaboration sometimes evokes inter-organizational struggles and how such struggles are played out in work to counter violent extremism.

This report summarizes the first part of the HEX-NA project (Handling Extremism - Nordic Approaches) and focuses on exploring different levels and types of policy on countering violent extremism in the Nordic countries (Iceland excluded). In the parts that follow, perceptions of among the public and public sector professionals will be explored and multiagency collaborative work in practice will be studied. HEX-NA is a three-year research project (2018-2021) funded by Nordforsk.
Mixing Logics

Multiagency Approaches for Countering Violent Extremism

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Introduction

Research Focus

Reading guidance

1. Background

1.1 Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalization

1.2 Perspectives on CVE and Handling the Problem

1.3 Nordic Collaboration on CVE

1.4 CVE – An Emerging Policy Field

1.5 National Action Plans

1.6 Multiagency Approaches

1.7 Civil Society Organizations

2. Theoretical and Methodological Frameworks

2.1 What is Policy?

2.2 Institutional Logics and Hybrid Organizations

2.3 Methodology – Making Policy Intelligible

3. Organizational Structures

3.1 Denmark

Danish SSP

Additional Services

3.2 Finland

Finnish Ankkuri - the Anchor team approach

Additional services

3.3 Norway

Norwegian SLT

Additional Services

3.4 Sweden

Swedish SSP(f)
Introduction

This report summarizes the first part of the HEX-NA project and focuses on exploring different levels and types of policy on countering violent extremism (CVE) in the Nordic countries (Iceland excluded). HEX-NA is the abbreviation for Handling Extremism - Nordic Approaches, a three-year research project (2018-2021) funded by Nordforsk under the call for “The underpinnings of Nordic Societal Security”\(^1\). The HEX-NA research team is coordinated from Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) and the University of Oslo and consists of researchers from different disciplines affiliated with Aarhus University in Denmark, Turku University in Finland, Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) at the University of Oslo and the Police University College, and the Segerstedt Institute at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden.

The project studies different aspects (policy, perceptions and practices) of multiagency approaches to handling violent extremism. Such collaborative work between agencies was (at the time of the project start) considered to be most extensively used in Denmark (SSP) and Norway (SLT), while somewhat less so in Finland (Ankkuri) and limited in Sweden (SSP[f]). Whether and how the model should be implemented more extensively and/or reformed to fit the CVE context is a much-debated topic, in Sweden in particular. This present study

will provide relevant input to this debate by describing and comparing different Nordic multiagency approaches aimed at Countering Violent Extremism.

Important points of departure for studying the multiagency approaches within the scope of the HEX-NA project are the core tenets of the Nordic governance model, namely policy legitimacy and mutual trust between government agencies/authorities and between citizens and government agencies/authorities. One hypothesis is that different frameworks and regulations affect the possibilities for multiagency collaborations and for sharing information between agencies, which may be crucial for success. In the project as a whole, this hypothesis will be tested in three interconnected studies of policy, perceptions and practices.
Research Focus

This first part of the study is focused on policy concerning multiagency cooperation in handling extremism and has as its explicit aim to address the following questions:

a) What are the similarities and differences in organizational structures of the SSP/SLT/ Ankkuri model in the four Nordic countries? What is the role of civil society organizations?

b) What are the practices recommended in national policy documents regarding a multiagency approach to CVE? How are the recommended practices advocated?

c) What are the possibilities and obstacles for sharing information posed by the legal frameworks and professional secrecy rules within and between agencies (police, schools and social services) in the four Nordic countries?

In short, this part of the project has three areas of focus for which we will use identified policy texts addressing CVE as the data to address these objectives. These areas of focus are: Organizational structures, Recommended practices and Legal frameworks.

Reading guidance

In writing this report, we have attempted to make each chapter into a separate section that can stand by itself, meaning that readers can choose to focus on areas of particular interest, or read the entire report. Chapters 1 and 2 constitute the background to the study as they focus on descriptions of the research and policy field and theoretical and methodological points of departure. Chapter 3 surveys the organizational structures while Chapter 4 focuses on recommended practices and advocacy for using multiagency approaches for countering violent extremism and radicalization. In Chapter 5, the legal
frameworks focusing possibilities and obstacles for exchanging information in preventive purposes between public agencies are mapped. Chapter 6 summarizes the conclusions of the survey, and thus constitutes the short version of the report. Finally, Chapter 7 consists of remarks on the analysis and discussions of the results. This chapter primarily depart from a critical point of view and explores (1) the policy-as-discourse-way of governing the field; and (2) how multiagency cooperation can be interpreted as a hybrid organizational space where different institutional logics mix.
1. Background

There seems to be a general understanding that terrorism is preceded by radicalization and extremism. Following the terrorist attacks in New York in 2001 and in the wake of “the War on Terror” (Hodges 2011), governments all over Europe have recognized the need to take action against violent extremism and terrorism at all levels of society, not just within the national security and military authorities (Schmid, 2013). Furthermore, recent events in the Nordic region have stressed the need for the prevention of violent extremism and for policy that deals with preventive measures. Such events include the terror attacks in Norway 2011 by Anders Behring Breivik; the Copenhagen terror attack in 2015 by Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussein; the stabbing attack in Turku in 2017 by Abderrahman Bouanane; the truck attack in Stockholm in 2017 by Rakhmat Akilov, and very recently, in August 2019, the attack on the mosque in Bærum by Philip Manshaus.

Even if there are some misconceptions in making direct causal links between terrorism and radicalization, and extremism and radicalization, violent extremism is a contemporary problem that calls for actions to prevent and counter the violence in itself and to protect those that might be affected by it. Internationally, prevention in this area is termed CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) and PVE (Preventing Violent Extremism). In this report, we primarily use the former term: CVE.
1.1 Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalization

There are multiple and sometimes contradictory ways of defining, understanding and linking together terrorism, extremism and radicalization among authorities, organizations and in academia (Kundnani, 2012; Schmid, 2013). Richard (2015) argues that “it appears that terrorism, radicalization and extremism have increasingly become merged into a single discursive framework” (p. 371). This merge is also evident in policy documents. However, there is some common ground to be found in the definitions.

**Terrorism** is usually understood as an act; a specific method of committing serious crime perpetrated by a non-state actor with a clear ideological motivation (Richards, 2015). Some are of the view that terrorism is always connected to political motives, while others claim that criminal gangs can use terrorism as a means of achieving their aims (Bjørgo, 2015). One fundamental problem with defining terrorism is the interpretative prerogative and the distinction between terrorism and legitimate resistance. However, the European Union has agreed upon a common definition of what constitutes a terrorist offence as:

acts committed with the aim of 'seriously intimidating a population', 'unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act', or 'seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization (European Parliament 2015 p.2).

However, this definition is rather state centric and not very relevant to the terrorist violence we encounter in the Nordic countries. Shootings, bombings or dynamite attacks on mosques, synagogues, asylum centres or attacks on people in public areas are often intended to terrorize a specific group rather than the state. Ravndal and Bjørgo (2018) suggest the definition of a terror attack as: 1) premised on political ideas, 2) a premeditated attack, and 3) the violence is intended to trigger psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target.
The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2016) also reaffirms that terrorism should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group. This means that a terrorist offence is first and foremost connected with intentional acts of violence aimed at the destruction of certain structures, and that connections with religious or political motives are of secondary importance. More or less formal organizations, such as the IRA or Al Qaida, which carry out terrorist acts, are referred to as terrorist organizations while an individual performing a similar act is called a terrorist.

**Extremism** is a related, normative term, that usually refers to broader ideological and political milieus, specific organizations and individuals that have attitudes, values, ideas, norms and behaviours that, in comparison with the majority political and religious mainstream norms, are viewed as extreme (Schmid, 2013). If violence is used or supported in order to achieve the extreme agenda of a movement, organization, group or individual, it might be labelled as “violent extremism”. In Sweden, an intermediate term between the terms extremism and violent extremism has been introduced, namely *violence affirming extremism*, which refers to those extremist milieus that support and accept violence but do not necessarily act in violent ways. A common understanding is that extremism has two dimensions: rejecting democracy and universal human rights, and justification of the use of violence for political goals.

In the Nordic region, there are three politically or religiously motivated milieus in focus: the violent right-wing or white supremacy movement; the violent left-wing or autonomous movement; and the violent Islamist movement. Besides these, there are examples of nuclear activists, animal rights activists and religious fundamentalist groups or sects that can be defined as extreme, without having the objective of disturbing or destroying democracy. In an overview of violent extremism as a concept and discourse, Helene Lööw (2017) states that there are problems with treating the three groups as one: “the violent extremists”. This unification erases ideological and tactical differences and makes the issue far too general. However, the common denominator and reason for being defined as extremist and at-risk milieus is that for different reasons, they reject current forms of democracy and democratic governance.
Radicalization is also a highly contested term, and among practitioners is often mixed up with extremism (Grossman & Tahiri, 2015), but usually refers to the gradual process by which someone becomes an extremist and/or terrorist (Lindekilde, 2012). These processes are often described in metaphorical terms as paths, stairways, rungs on a ladder or as jig saw puzzles. In Finland, the term violent radicalization is used along with extremism. Even though extremism and radicalization are intertwined and related by violence, they are not necessarily aligned: individuals who hold extremist views or attitudes might never engage in violent acts (Horgan, 2008). To highlight this phenomenon, research on radicalization points out that a distinction between cognitive and behavioural radicalization should be made (Neumann, 2013). Cognitive radicalization is about developing, accepting and supporting values, ideologies and attitudes that are radically different from mainstream societal norms. Behavioural radicalization focuses on acts and behaviours; the action “pathways” leading to violence and activities aimed at disturbing, destroying and damaging societies.

The terrorism/extremism problem

In the annual threat assessments compiled by the security services in the Nordic countries the challenges for society are framed as terrorism and violent extremism as a single problem (in Denmark, Norway and Sweden) or as two separately assessed threats (Finland). Using different scales, both Denmark (level 4 of 5), Finland (level 2 of 4), Norway (level 3 of 5) and Sweden (level 3 of 5) assess the overall terrorist threat to be elevated or significant. These scales define probabilities for various incidents related to different extremist groups merged into one combined threat. This merging and differentiation in definitions makes it difficult to discern how the threat stemming from violent extremism is assessed. However, as recognized by Ravndal (2017), the numbers used for assessing threats are most likely biased as they rely on different data and on crimes and delinquencies registered in different ways.

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2 Annual threat assessments for 2018 were collected from the Danish Centre for Terror Analysis (CTA) 2018; the Finnish security intelligence service SUPO (2018) & Ministry of the Interior 2018a, 2018b; the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) 2018; and the Swedish Security Service SÄPO & NTC 2018.
Thus, assessments give an indication rather than a reliable view of the current status.

When assessing the threat from extremism and terrorism at a national level, the problem is represented as potential risk, most likely scenarios, probabilities and estimations based on intelligence information. While these scenarios and probabilities may be proven to be correct in the future, they do not seem to rely on past experiences. To give an example, the assessments of Islamic extremism include issues of social control, such as intimidation of Muslim women and girls, rather than terror attacks by Islamic extremist groups. How the problem relates to Islamic extremism seem to be uncertain, and the potential threat to society seems to be exaggerated because it includes probable incidents. When Malkki and Saarinen (2019) present their overview of jihadism in Finland, it shows that even though individuals involved in Jihadist activism in Finland have increased in the past decade, it is still relatively low-scale in comparison with other western European countries. The milieu is described as fragmented and unorganized, and activism consists mainly of small-scale, non-violent support activities. In early 2019, the growth phase seems to be losing its momentum.

The Nordic countries have suffered some incidents where lone actors have committed atrocities inspired by extremist convictions. The terror attack in Oslo and Utøya on 22 July 2011 was the most fatal attack in Europe since the incidents in Beslan in 2004. In Oslo, the terrorist killed eight people and 69 young individuals were murdered on the island of Utøya. The attack was carried out by a right-wing fascist acting alone. He was not following orders, was not financed or given any logistical support by any organization (Gardell, 2017; Hemmingby & Bjørgo, 2016). However, his ideological beliefs and the manifesto he distributed before committing the terrorist acts is firmly rooted in nationalism, nationalistic conservatism and hatred of Muslims. In Sweden, there have been a number of incidents where lone wolves with a right-wing extremist agenda have carried out lethal/fatal deeds. John Ausonius (also known as the Laser man) shot 11 people (who he believed looked ‘non-white’) and ended up killing one between 1991-1992. In the years between 2003 and 2010, Peter Mangs shot and killed two people, and attempted to kill or harm at least 10 others in Malmö. Mangs has confessed to killing several others in addition to the murders.
he was convicted of (Palmqvist 2015; Gardell 2015). He has defined his actions as “a low-key terror war against multiculturalism” (Gardell, 2015). In 2015, a young man in Sweden murdered three non-white individuals at a school in Trollhättan. In 2017, Rakhmat Akilov ran down pedestrians on Drottninggatan in Stockholm, killing five people and injuring many more. The deed was inspired by religious Islamic terrorist organizations, even if none claimed responsibility for it.

One of the most prevalent extremist organizations in the Nordic countries, and especially in Sweden, is the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM), an aggressive national socialist organization with the aim of creating a Nordic national socialist state. As Mattsson and Johansson (2019) describe the movement, it is the largest hub for neo-Nazis in the Nordic countries. NRM members have made their presence felt through provocative public meetings and rallies. Through the frequently updated website “Nordfront”, they are active in producing news, radio programmes, calls for activism, and so on. Members of the NRM have been convicted of planting bombs close to housing for asylum seekers.

In threat assessments and evaluations, (violent) extremist activities are mentioned far less frequently than terrorism. For example, harassment and death threats against political opponents, violent clashes between opposing groups, arson attacks on housing for refugees, illegal weapons, combat training, and propagating extremist ideologies are fairly common events in the Nordic region. Participating in such extremist milieus has a negative impact on young peoples’ lives in terms of stigmatization and social marginalization, and on potential future family and working life. Such activities may also have a negative impact on the local community in many ways, causing conflicts, stigmatizing communities, etc. In surveys among Norwegian politicians in the parliament (Fisher Bjelland and Bjørgo, 2014; Bjørgo & Silkoset, 2017), it is made clear that threats from extremist individuals cause fear and disrupt their work as elected representatives and their private lives. The fact that politicians are concerned about their own or their loved ones’ safety to the extent that they in some cases consider leaving, or actually do leave their positions, is proof of extremism being a serious threat to democracy.
Thus, violent extremism and radicalization is a present threat to safety, the sense of security and social harmony. Thus, we need to consider how extremism and extremist views and actions may harm individuals and society.

Since the term radicalization is contested, and in many ways relative, one must always relate it to the current political norm to discern what is radical. Sikkens, van San, Sieckelink and de Winter (2018) suggest that “radicalization is the process through which an adolescent or young adult develops ideals that are severely at odds with those of their family or the mainstream” (p.2276). Thus, this definition predominately pinpoints young adults and adolescents as vulnerable for radicalization, a focus which is being increasingly contested (Andersson Malmros, forthcoming; i.e. Norwegian Security Police, 2016; 2019 and Gustafsson & Ranstorp, 2017). However, adolescents and young adults are the groups that are the primary focus of the Nordic multiagency approaches. Radical extremist views and actions are generally considered to be a phenomenon related to young people and mainly occurring among men.

There are many theories that attempt to explain why young people engage in violent extremism. Attraction factors can be an ideological conviction, the excitement, adventurousness, and the chance of finding a temporary family (Simi et al. 2016), and one recurring factor is a sense of belonging or rather the sense of not belonging in mainstream society (e.g. Bjørgo 2005; Kimmel, 2007; Simi, Sporer & Bubolz, 2016; Vestel & Bakken 2016; Mattsson & Johansson, 2019). Another dimension of engagement is seeking authoritarian leadership that can give direction and security in an otherwise insecure life situation (Rieger et al. 2017). A sense of security can also be an important aspect in times of economic and social uncertainty when young people might risk being unemployed. Also, school failure and negative social experiences, exclusion and discouragement are prevalent explanations (Lhotzy, 2001; Braunthal, 2010; Larsson & Björk, 2015; Schafer et al. 2014). Thus, radicalization is firmly connected with search for belonging, hope, identity and identification with a group or with other individuals.

A common trend in research and policy is the idea that radicalization can be predicted by identification of “at-risk” signs. Lists of such signs
are often handed out to schools, social services and other agencies that meet young people in their everyday work. These are often concerned with behaviours and changes that can be detected by professionals. Examples of such behaviour include: changes in style and clothing; religious obsession; display of symbols; truancy; growing facial hair, etc. (Andersson Malmros, 2019).

Signs of risk can also be related to risks in upbringing that can make children and young people more vulnerable to extremist propaganda and potentially joining a violent group. One such sign is the prevalence of extremist attitudes in the near vicinity, as extremist attitudes can be passed down in families and communities (Schafer et.al. 2014; Skiple, 2018). Other environmental risk factors are domestic conflicts, violence and alcohol abuse along with experiences of school failure or bullying in school.

As stated by Mattsson, Hammarén and Odenbring (2016), the radicalization discourse tends to focus on how individuals can cause harm to society, missing out on the fact that the young individual can come to harm. Besides the dangers related to physical confrontations, attraction to or involvement in an extremist movement can cause stigmatization and ostracizing of both the individual and his/her family (Brittain, 2009; Spalek, 2016).

### 1.2 Perspectives on CVE and Handling the Problem

In the CVE field, it is rather widely acknowledged that there are at least two main approaches to handling the problem. One is security measures, the other is social preventive measures (Herz, 2016). Security measures are those that are supposed to protect and ensure that social institutions, infrastructure and citizens are not injured or harmed. Such measures therefore aim to reduce the capacity of already radicalized extremists and the vulnerability of potential targets (Bjørgo, 2013; 2017). Examples of such measures can include securing public spaces, key infrastructure nodes and gathering places. “Security-by-design” (Richter-Friis van Deurs, 2017) is a term that
entered the CVE debate to conceptualize security as integrated in the design of public spaces and streets. The placing of large concrete benches on the shopping street Kungsgatan in Gothenburg and of spacious cast iron flowerpots on Karl Johan Boulevard in Oslo and on Strøget in Copenhagen are examples of how aesthetic elements have been placed in the urban space to ensure that no cars or trucks can access the pedestrian space and run people down. Other security measures are adjustments made in legal frameworks and the strengthening of security services’ capacity for action. Common examples are intensified border controls, the criminalization of acts related to preparations for or assistance to terrorist attacks or financial support or assistance to terrorist groups (Malkki, 2016).

On the other hand, social preventive measures are primarily focused on preventing and reducing the intention to commit extremist acts. While the security measures aim to protect infrastructure and citizens from imminent attacks, the social preventive measures have a longer term perspective and focus on winning “the hearts and minds” of at-risk individuals (Kundnani, 2012; Bjørgo, 2016). Such efforts are heavily influenced by the introduction of radicalization as a way to understand what goes on before the bomb goes off (Neumann, 2008): if there is a pathway to extremism and terrorism, it can be detected and reversed. Consequently, preventive measures or actions are primarily seen as part of the general public good, welfare and social services such as education as they are expected to build resilience in the face of acts of violence and anti-democratic tendencies.

The measures advocated in the CVE policies in the Nordic countries are often divided into three levels in a “preventive pyramid”, which are often used in crime prevention strategies and policy documents. The three levels are supposed to build on each other: the primary level includes measures intended to improve general resilience and democratizing practices through citizen education and the promotion of critical skills. The secondary level includes measures aimed at individuals at risk of being radicalized, such as educating front-line

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3 e.g. DKR 2012; Skr. 204/15:144; DK 2016: SOU 2017:110;
staff in how they can detect and identify individuals at risk. The tertiary level includes measures aimed at individuals assessed as being part of extremist movements, including mentoring programmes, support for relatives and exit programmes (Sivenbring 2017; Rambøll 2017). The multiagency approaches in focus for our study are mainly located in the secondary level, but also extend out to the primary and tertiary levels to different degrees.

Figure 1. Preventive pyramid

The social and security perspectives are both apparently influential in how the problems of radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism are handled, and the three levels in the prevention pyramid all make crucial contributions to preventing future delinquencies and crime. There have been some disciplinary struggles between what has been described as more repressive approaches that emphasise punishment and restrictions, and welfare approaches that mimic programmes and

4 National center for forebyggelse af Ekstremisme, [Avaialble 2019-08-14 from: https://stopekstremisme.dk/forebyggelsesindsats]
methods designed to handle other forms of youth delinquency (Burnett & Appleton, 2004). As stated in the Finnish National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism (FI, 2016):

> It is possible to reduce the threat of terrorism and massacres by preventing violent extremism. It is important to bring the perpetrators of serious crime to justice. In recent years, Finland has reviewed its legislation associated with terrorist crime and the conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. Nevertheless, according to studies, the penal system and the fear of punishment fail to reduce violence. (ibid. p.12).

The Nordic approach is one that strives to combine the two perspectives by addressing the problem from different angles, and is not an approach that tries to advocate one in preference to the other: “The challenge therefore is to find balance and constructive synergy between the short-term repressive and controlling strategies and the more long-term, constructive strategies” (Bjørgo, 2013, p.3).

It is far from clear how conceptual approaches to understanding radicalization and extremism have been perceived among those who are involved in local CVE efforts. In a study of CVE action plans in 60 Scandinavian municipalities, Andersson Malmros (2019) found a tangible confusion about whether or not radicalization is regarded as a process at all, given the fact that many municipalities actually conceived radicalization as a static outcome and/or a political/religious position. Furthermore, the plans displayed a plethora of versions of the differences between being radical and being extremist and what the causes of radicalization are believed to be (in total, 66 different causes are mentioned in the plans), and how to determine that someone is at risk of becoming radicalized. Hence, radicalization is far from a self-evident term when translated into local CVE efforts (Andersson Malmros, 2019).

## 1.3 Nordic Collaboration on CVE

Founded on common values and a strong tradition of democratic governance, the countries of the Nordic region collaborate in a long line of issues. All of the Nordic national action plans for handling extremism and radicalization (and additional documents), explicitly
state that the Nordic countries would benefit from further and extended cooperation in their preventive efforts against violent extremism. With the purpose of establishing such cooperation between the Nordic countries, the *Nordic Network to Prevent Extremism* was initiated in 2015. The network functions as a common forum where the ministries responsible for the preventive efforts concerning radicalization and extremism, amongst other things, can discuss and develop policies. In the Network’s programme statement, important issues emphasised are the development of preventive efforts and methods for early interventions targeted at young individuals who are believed to be vulnerable to radicalization; support for individuals who are already involved in extremist groups; and the development of exit strategies for helping individuals to break out of extremist networks.

The Nordic Council’s (2018) International Strategy for 2018-2022 elaborates further on the prolonging and strengthening of cooperation within the Nordic region. The strategy states that the cooperation should be exploited to a far greater extent and that the Nordic countries should work more closely together on issues such as international affairs, defence and security. Among its main priorities the Nordic Council wants to:

- strive to ensure that democracy, the rule of law, equality and human rights are always high on the international agenda (…)
- The Nordic region must take the lead in combating extremism, anti-democratic attitudes, racism and all other forms of hate and discrimination (Nordic Council, 2018, p.2).

Due to their long tradition of cooperation, there are many similarities in how the Nordic societies develop actions to meet the challenges posed by violent extremism and radicalization. Some of the actions and methods advocated by policy in a Nordic country may be directly inherited from a neighbouring country. For instance, the Danish Aarhus model is often exemplified as a model for different multiagency approaches in the region. However, there are national differences with

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5 Nordic Network to prevent violent extremism. available 2019-08-14 at: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/sub/radikalisering/radikaliseringskonferanse/cooperatio n-agreement-of-the-nordic-network-to-prevent-extremism/id2364665/

6 Iceland is not incorporated in this particular project, since Iceland has not yet been affected by terrorism and does not have any action plans or well-developed efforts in CVE.
regard to what governs CVE efforts in the different Nordic countries. As Heath-Kelly (2013) has argued, expertise and knowledge about radicalization and extremism are active in the production and legitimization of policy and actions. As the sources of expertise and knowledge differ between the countries, there are different explanations and solutions for the problem of extremism. Also, some differences rely on national organizational structures for regions, municipalities and government agencies. One of the areas where the differences are believed to be most evident is concerned with the possibilities to cooperate, to intervene and to share information between government agencies.

The Nordic Council of Ministers (2017) emphasised the open societies in the Nordic countries and their strong belief in everybody’s possibilities to contribute to ensuring trustful, tolerant and resilient cities. In this effort, the Council has initiated the Nordic Safe Cities Network which functions as a collaborative forum. In this network, cities are regarded as organized units which can pool efforts to create safe and inclusive environments. There is a strong belief in the power and efficiency of local efforts: “When they work, they provide citizens with a chance to play a meaningful and important role in society” (ibid. s, 8). The Nordic Safe Cities Network has formulated six aims for safer cities, namely: Safe Urban Spaces; Safe Online Sphere; Strong Families; Safe Public Institutions; Strong Youth Engagement, and Safe Communities.

The following section describes the emergence of CVE/PVE initiatives in the Nordic countries. Furthermore, it outlines some of the previous research and reports that have studied preventive efforts and the development of CVE at the national level in the Nordic region.

1.4 CVE – An Emerging Policy Field

By policy field we are referring to national, regional or local organizations responsible for and involved in implementing public programmes in a particular field, in this case the field of countering violent extremism and radicalization. There are different levels, actors and agencies involved in policy fields. In studying these, one might turn
to documented policy but also to the actions implemented, to assessments, evaluations, public opinion, the press and so on. The policy field concerned with countering and preventing terrorism, extremism and radicalization in the Nordic region is relatively new and also one that has undergone rapid development driven by the incidents that have occurred in the region. Using the words of Leena Malkki (2016): “Nothing drives counter terrorism policy making like a (spectacular) terrorist attack” (p.343). Different events in Europe and the Nordic region have quite simply warranted certain measures to safeguard society against terrorist attacks and extremist activities. The particular policy field is also an interesting example of how policy is implemented when the intended actors comprise a string of different professions with a variety of norms and logics. It is also a highly politicized field that is dependent on contemporary events and incidents around the world.

Even if the policy field revolving around violent extremism and terrorism is a relatively new one, it is still an amalgamation of already existing policy fields (such as the police, security, criminal justice, education, social welfare, youth work, etc.). The field has undergone both revisions and changes in how the problem of extremism is believed to be best understood, prevented and/or countered. An analysis of the Nordic Action plans against radicalization and violent extremism (Sivenbring, 2017) concludes that measures and actions in the plans express the need for more research and knowledge. The need for knowledge and more research is mainly focused on seeking evidence of best practices and knowledge of how to identify and report vulnerable and suspicious individuals. This can be understood as a rational step in the ongoing development of a transdisciplinary field in need of reliable knowledge and methods.

Policy documents and texts serve as manifestations of current understandings, and as such they also give some clues as to how the problem is rationalized and made sense of. The development of policy as shared understandings also seems to be of great importance in itself. The Finnish Ministry of Interior (2018b) states that:

A key element in the prevention of terrorism is to incorporate the prevention of polarisation and inequality in society in policies and strategies. Polarisation and social exclusion
increase a sense of alienation, which in turn may breed violent radicalization and terrorism (ibid, p.15).

This statement appears to be saying that there are some indications of root causes for extremism and that policy can serve as a gateway for achieving different overarching goals in a society, such as preventing inequality and social exclusion.

With the best of intentions, some of the measures and actions will not necessarily reflect what policymakers understand as what works against terrorism, “but rather are influenced just as much by what seems politically beneficial” (Malkki 2016, s. 344). This mean that policy development in the field could be defined as incremental (Lindekilde, 2015); as decisions and actions are developed and initiated gradually in small steps through negotiations and adaptations between actors.

However, as the problem is mainly framed as an issue of national security, the initial starting point is the security stance. Therefore, there are to this day only limited or no specific policies that govern how different professionals (such as social workers, teachers, healthcare experts) engage with clients who may be at risk of radicalization, who have become involved in terrorism, or who are trying to exit terrorist organizations.

In 2017, the Danish Ministry of Immigration and Integration commissioned Rambøll Management Consulting to carry out a descriptive survey of the Nordic countries’ efforts to prevent extremism (Rambøll 2017). One of the points of inquiry in their report was to map out the organization of preventive efforts and to show at what levels they are anchored. The report concludes that CVE efforts are solely or primarily anchored in the ministries responsible for domestic security. Furthermore, it concludes that all the Nordic countries have adopted a multiagency approach to prevention, and that it is common to integrate preventive work into existing cooperative crime prevention structures.
1.5 National Actionplans

Denmark adopted their first national action plans against extremism in 2009\(^7\) and are occasionally portrayed as pioneers in the CVE policy field\(^8\). This plan has been criticized however for making anecdotal connections between problems of radicalization, immigration, and integration issues (Lindekilde, 2012; 2015). In 2014, the plan was replaced by an updated version\(^9\). According to a press release from the Danish government, this plan stressed the importance of multiagency cooperation\(^10\). Since 2016, this plan has been revised a second time and its actions are more directed towards specific target groups and the use of local resources. The plan in question is called Preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalisation, National action plan\(^11\) and was born out of inter-ministerial working groups, but falls today within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing\(^12\) (the action plan is hereafter designated as DK, 2016). The plan states that the current national and international state of affairs calls for the protection of fundamental values and individuals’ rights that “form the basis of our society” (DK, 2016, p.3). Thus, there is a need for strengthening efforts against terrorism and extremism. The action plan further emphasizes that a comprehensive preventive effort from both national and local authorities as well as civil society is required.

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\(^7\) Regeringen.DK (2008). A common and safe future– action plan to prevent extremistviews and radicalisation of youth. Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs. (DK)

\(^8\) Axess.se. 2019-06-17. Ranstorp, M. Låt oss lära av Danmark. [available 2019-06-17 : https://axess.se/magasin/default.aspx?article=4056&fbclid=IwAR1dCnico1dqdlS2F3rEFKncO2gz3JjaLmSk1Ixf12BqXRr1NZETxhXK1#.XLR_U2P5t8.]


\(^12\) [Udlændige-, integrations- og boligministeriet]
In Finland the Ministry of the Interior coordinates national prevention of violent radicalization measures via the National action plan for the prevention of violent radicalization13 (hereafter designated as FI, 2016). The Finnish policies use the term violent radicalization, while the other Nordic countries’ policies use radicalization and violent extremism. The action plan targets individuals and groups who are regarded as at risk of radicalization. The aim is to make sure that there are stable structures and the capability to prevent radicalization before it occurs (Elo et al. 2017; Finnish National Agency for Education, 2018). In an earlier national action plan, extremism and radicalization was described as a somewhat marginal problem and at this point in time, the issue is not perceived as an actual threat. However, Finnish society has had some experiences with school shootings, which is reflected in the current National action plan for the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism adopted. According to the Finnish plan (FI, 2016), the primary goal of prevention is to reduce threats and violence against people. Together with the Ministry, the police are given the overarching responsibility for preventive efforts: “The Ministry and its Police Department remain responsible for matters regarding order and security in public places. Violent extremism, as a phenomenon, relates to the core of maintaining public order and safety of individuals and communities as well as protecting civil rights” (ibid. p.14).

The police are framed as the most important source of knowledge and expertise, especially when it comes to identifying individuals at risk of radicalization and directing professionals to services that can be of help. Knowledge of how to detect at-risk individuals is especially important for those working directly with young individuals. The police are responsible for public order and security: to guarantee a safe and secure living environment (FI, 2016). Municipalities are responsible for providing services that promote citizens’ wellbeing and participation, while civil society organizations provide services that can strengthen people's participation, social interaction and spiritual life.

Norway introduced an actionplan against racist violence in a specific local community as early as 199114 (Carlsson, 1995). In 2010 their first

13 Ministry of the Interior. (2012). Towards cohesive society - action plan to prevent violent extremism. (Fi)
14 Aksjonsplan Brumanddal.
national policy for preventing extremism was issued\textsuperscript{15}. Since the political landscape and assessed threat were changing, a new plan was issued in 2014 that built on the previous plan, adding new knowledge and experiences and concrete measures. \textit{The Action Plan against Radicalisation and Violent Extremism\textsuperscript{16} (2014)} is defined by the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security as a dynamic plan, meaning that it is annually assessed and revised. A new major revision of the action plan has started in 2019. According to the current plan, it is also supplemented by action plans for the prevention of crime\textsuperscript{17}. One third of the 30 actions listed in the action plan focus on knowledge and expertise; the plan is pervaded by the need for, and the development and utilization of available and new knowledge and skills. For example, radicalization and extremism is to be incorporated into the training of police and correctional officers. Just like the Danish action plan, the Norwegian plan (NO, 2014) is primarily centred around judicial and security measures and 16 of the 30 measures in the action plan are coordinated by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. In comparison, the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion is responsible for 5; Ministry of Education and Research handles 3 and the Ministry of Health and Care Services coordinates 2. The Ministries of Cultural Affairs and of Foreign Affairs each coordinate 1 measure.

In \textit{Sweden}, the \textit{Action Plan for Safeguarding Democracy against Violent Extremism} was issued in 2011\textsuperscript{18}, after which the transparency of the policy field became somewhat muddied. In 2013, the 2011 plan was accompanied by the official commission of inquiry (SOU 2013:81)\textsuperscript{19} which suggested measures for cooperation and education to increase the effectiveness of preventive efforts against violent extremism. An

\begin{footnotes}
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official communication (Skr 2014/15:144)\textsuperscript{20} was issued in 2015 containing actions for making society more resistant to violent extremism. The recommended actions were evaluated in 2018\textsuperscript{21}. In 2016, the national coordinator issued a *National Strategy against Violent Extremism*\textsuperscript{22}. In 2017, a new official commission of inquiry (2017:110)\textsuperscript{23} evaluated the work of, and provided some input on how to replace, the national coordinator. The replacement was completed in early 2018 and the responsibility for handling issues of violent extremism and radicalization currently rests with the *Ministry of Justice*. The Swedish Prison and Probation Service (*Kriminalvården*), the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ), the police and security police are placed under this ministry. The *Swedish Centre for Preventing Violent Extremism* was established in 2018 and placed under the governance of BRÅ. The centre’s main objectives depart from the field of criminal policy and focus on strengthening and developing the work of preventing violent extremism, ideologically motivated criminality, and terrorism.

In a personal communication with the Swedish Centre for Preventing Violent Extremism\textsuperscript{24}, actors refer to the Government’s strategy for countering terrorism (Skr. 2014/15:146)\textsuperscript{25}, the national coordinator’s final report (SOU 2017:110), *Förordning 2016:1201 med instruktion för Brottsförebyggande rådet* (Ordinance with instructions for the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention) and the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention’s final report on the task of preparing for a centre for preventing violent extremism\textsuperscript{26}. In conclusion, there are a number of policy documents and legislation for

\textsuperscript{24} Per e-mail of 2019-05-07
handling extremism, and some confusion on what policy it is that governs the field in Sweden.

1.6 Multiagency Approaches

Prevention of radicalization and violent extremism is a complex task that calls for complex solutions (Bjørgo, 2011). One of the problems with handling violent extremism is that it involves challenges that no single actor or agency has the knowledge, information or operational space to solve. These challenges can be met by identifying the expertise needed for providing solutions and putting together permanent or temporary teams of specialists in their respective areas who work together in order to solve the problem. In Denmark, this kind of organized collaboration has been functioning for decades (Bertelsen, 2015; Hemmingsen, 2015). In a RAN paper, the Danish multi-professional cooperative SSP model is referred to as “the model for multiagency working with a key role for the police” (Lenos & Keltjens, 2017, p. 3).

The objective of setting up multiagency cooperative teams may seem unambiguous, but their purpose and the techniques they use for addressing problems might be very different (Sarma, 2018). Also, organizational arrangements can differ depending on whether the primary objective is to work preventively, making sure that no individuals get involved with extremist milieus; or if the objective is to prevent radicalized individuals from causing any harm to society; or if it is to support those who wish to exit from extremist or terrorist organizations. Although there are few (if any) empirical studies that have focused on multiagency approaches with the specific task of handling radicalization, violent extremism or terrorism, there are studies that support the use of this kind of approach for tackling other “wicked problems” (i.e. Davies, 2016).

In Denmark, this multiagency approach to general crime prevention has been used frequently since the late 1970s (Bertelsen, 2015), while the multiagency approach is described in Finnish research as a rather new trend for which there is a growing need (Pohjola & Korhonen, 2014). However, while Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden all
have experiences of handling extremism and radicalization via multiagency approaches, they differ in terms of their practical implementation and organizational setups.

One of the main reasons for the differences in the Nordic countries’ multiagency approaches is the use of pre-existing structures and initiatives that were initially developed for other purposes or crime prevention activities. Since the often-alleged signs of radicalization and violent extremism among young individuals mimics other identified “at-risk behaviours”, the view has been that established models and strategies can be adapted and used to prevent and intervene against radicalization. As exemplified by Norway’s National Crime Prevention Council (KRÅD) (2011), measures to prevent drug abuse among young individuals may also prevent criminality. The goal is the same: to prevent criminality and other problems that can cause damage on citizens and/or society.

Early intervention is at the core of the Nordic approach and collaboration between schools, social services and the police is called the School, Social services, Police (SSP) model in Denmark, SSP(f) in Sweden (where the f stands for ‘fritids’ or after-school centres), and Coordination of local drug abuse and crime prevention measures (SLT) in Norway. Since 2014, Finland has adopted a similar approach which it calls Anchor teams (Ankkuri in Finnish), which are to be set up in all Finnish municipalities (Ministry of the Interior, 2014). Even if the backbone for this collaboration is the school, social services and police, a multiagency approach to CVE may also involve other professions such as psychiatry, the prisons system, and community or civil society organizations. The multiagency approach to preventing and countering violent extremism rests on the core tenets of the Nordic governance model, which are legitimacy and mutual trust – between government agencies and between citizens and the authorities. Despite their similarities, the three Scandinavian countries appear to implement this model in quite different ways.

As Blagg et al. (1998) describe it, multiagency approaches are often portrayed as ‘an unproblematically good thing’. However, research points to possibilities, problems and challenges that occur as agencies with different agendas and expertise come together. One such problem
is that there seems to be scope for disjunctions between formulation in policy and realization among practitioners (Pearson et al. 1992). Other challenges can be the use of language, reflecting different disciplinary backgrounds among the practitioners and their training, and, diversity awareness and the use of terminology to address clients with: are students, patients, victims or young people the focus of an intervention? Such disciplinary differences are pointed out as aspects that can cause internal conflicts. In fact, internal conflicts in teams of professionals working together across institutional boundaries seem to be rather common. Brown et al. (2011) explored such conflicts in Canadian multiagency teams within health and social welfare and found that they are often focused around role boundary issues, scope of practice, and accountability. Thus, there might be some issues concerned with dynamic factors such as the process of collaboration, trust, power and commitment between different actors working together in multi-professional collaboration teams (Willumsen, 2008). Another challenge that is often mentioned is the focus of Part 5 of this report: namely problems connected with legal and procedural barriers for exchanging information between agencies (Sarma, 2018).

1.7 Civil Society Organizations

Civil society can be described as the sphere between the state, the market and private households. The Swedish civil society bill (prop. 2009/10:55) specifies the sphere as one where people, groups and organizations act together with common interests. As Chaskin (2003) recognizes, social policy often turns to local communities and civil society for support in planning and providing actions in relation to a number of social issues. In the RAN (2016) Ex post paper Handbook on how to set up a multiagency structure that includes the health and social care sectors?, civil society organizations and NGOs are given ample space. When recommending the involvement of local communities, this is legitimized by their closeness and access to citizens. “Seeing and having to cooperate with familiar faces will help engage vulnerable people in addressing their potential problems” (RAN, 2016, p.3).

In preventive efforts to safeguard democracy in the Nordic countries, civil society and its organizations can provide support and actions that
focus on social and societal efforts in the local neighbourhood. According to Chaskin (2003), local connections and knowledge stem from a democratic point of view where the participation of local communities and its citizens will make policy implementation more effective and efficient.

Neighbourhood participations is seen to promote more responsive, competent programs; place boundaries on and refocus municipal agendas; establish greater trust in government; create a more equitable distribution of public goods; increase social interaction and a sense of community among residents; and strengthen the link between citizens and government (Chaskin, 2003. p. 163).

Although the local connection can be regarded as enhancing democracy and trust, research on civil society organizations (CSOs) show that these are often dependent on project based funds and state grants (Herz 2016; Sivenbring & Mattsson 2019). This makes the efforts and projects handled by these organizations vulnerable, as such funding is often limited in time. Some argue that in many modern democracies, the social welfare system has withdrawn its institutional efforts in certain areas, one such area being social work that used to be managed by social services. As shown by Marcus Herz (2016), much of the social work in democracies is now done by volunteers and non-profit organizations.

When it comes to social and welfare work, new societal expectations and challenges can cause blurred lines between what is considered public, civil society or private. Herz (2019) believes that this lack of clarity has led to a change in the logic of the work conducted by civil society and that is has become more influenced by the public and private spheres. In the Nordic action plans and policies, civil society organizations are given some attention and implicit responsibility to contribute to the handling of violent extremism. One way of supporting and legitimizing such responsibilities is to give them funds for projects that are intended to work preventively against violent extremism and to demand that these organizations produce valid results (Sivenbring & Mattsson, 2019). Making CSOs dependent on project funding can jeopardize their efficiency and effectiveness. The financial uncertainty can make it difficult to get a successful programme and appropriate activities up and running before it is time
to apply for new funding (ibid. 2019). As Chaskin (2003) acknowledges, the differences in connection, accountability, and terms and conditions for CSOs creates a loosely connected system of organizations and associations, forced to interact with each other and with formal systems of governance in improvised ways.

One obstacle that needs to be recognized (and respected) when incorporating civil society organizations into multiagency structures is that these do not have the same legal obligations or restrictions as government agencies. Government agencies are generally not allowed to share information with external actors, while civil society organizations might be in possession of information which, for reasons of professional secrecy and ethics, they cannot or will not share.
2. Theoretical and Methodological Frameworks

This section of the report aspires to define our ways of understanding policy and how policy mapping and analysis is conducted. Furthermore, it describes ways of understanding the multiagency approach as a hybrid organizational setting. The definitions and distinctions are of significance for giving transparency and rationality to the conclusions drawn for this part of the project.

2.1 What is Policy?

To make policy mapping and analysing intelligible, we need to distinguish what policy is, can be and how policy is understood or conceptualized, depending on the theoretical stance of the researchers. The most familiar way of describing policy is that “policy is a set of actions taken to solve a problem” (Walker, 2000, p. 14). These sets of ideas or plans of action for particular situations are established and agreed upon by a group of people, an organization, a government, or a political party. Paul Spickler (2006) defines policy in the simplest sense as decisions about a course of action. Teun Van Dongen (2010) suggests that a common definition could be that a policy will include elements of ‘aim’ and ‘resources’, as policy is always a result of analysing a problem and conscious choices regarding the resources to
solve it. These definitions give policy an air of being a rational, utilitarian technique: policymakers agree on a set of actions and objectives which, if they are met, should solve the problem at hand. In this sense, policy is rational and functional and perceived as capable of producing solutions to social problems (Parsons, 1995; Clarke, 1999). A second perspective on policy is that it is not functional, but rather symbolic (Clarke, 1999). Symbolic policies are crafted by organizations seeking legitimacy by their environment. Policy can, according to this point of view, be viewed as “window-dressing”, adopted to show that the organization is modern and progressive, in control of a particular problem or simply because other relevant stakeholders have adopted the same type of policy (Clarke, 1999; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

Meyer and Rowan (1977) proposed that organizations decouple their formal structure from their informal practices. Even though superficially adopting a rationalized object (e.g. a CVE policy), the practices or reforms partnering the object never gets fully implemented or implemented differently. Hence, decoupling is to consciously “disconnect between organizational practice and organizational structure” (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017, p. 80). By engaging in decoupling, an organization can maintain or improve its legitimacy from its external environment, while neglecting the implementation of practices that are considered harmful, inefficient or inconsistent with the aim and values of the organization.

**Policy as text or policy as discourse**

In this particular study, we define policy in two ways, one of which enables a more conventional descriptive analysis that can show similarities and differences within and between the Nordic countries. This is what Ball (1993) would define as *policy as text*. Although written and documented, these texts are products of compromise and contestations at various stages in the process and always in a state of flux. However, we use the term *policy as text* as a way of focusing on the manifested content of the policies, without giving attention to how policy is acted on or can be analytically interpreted.
The other definition sees policy as discourse (Ball, 1993) which allows for a more theoretical and critical analysis, and enabling revelations of potential discrepancies, tensions, gaps and bridges. Echoing the words of Michel Foucault (1997), discourses are practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak and are active in the production of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’. Thus, policy as discourse can be perceived as responsible for similar constructions; they produce certain knowledge and truths about objects. In this case, they contribute by producing knowledge and truths about radicalization and violent extremism and rational and logic ways of explaining and handling the problem. Policy as part of governmental solutions to societal problems also contains implicit representations of what is considered to be “the problem” (Bacchi, 2015; Bacchi & Goodwin 2016), or “What’s the Problem Represented to be” (WPR). In other words, actions, solutions and problematizations say something of how the problem is constructed, and who/what might be considered to be the problem (Bacchi, 2015). One example of how this is embodied is that even though the Nordic countries have been dealing with various problems connected with left- and right-wing extremism since the 1930s, these problems have not been debated to the same extent as Islamic extremism, nor have they had the magnitude needed for setting up national action plans to prevent the problem. Also, the problem of radicalization has just recently begin to be associated with extreme right- or left-wing attitudes or ideologies in public debate. On the other hand, the events in USA on 9/11, and the wake of the “war on terror”, have combined to “speak the problem into being” (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p.72).

Our lives are more or less “saturated with policy” (Brown, 1998); legislative frameworks, rules and regulations are constantly present and influence who we are, what we can say and do, and how we act. In this sense, policy is regarded as an instrument of government. The term governmentality (Foucault, 1977) gives an analytical focus to techniques and activities aimed at shaping, guiding or influencing people in a certain direction. Foucault (1997) defines governmentality as “an activity that undertakes to conduct individuals throughout their lives by placing them under the authority of a guide responsible for what they do and for what happens to them” (ibid. 68).
If a more conventional policy analysis focuses on policies as addressing actual societal problems, a critical policy analysis focuses on the represented problem per se, and on how these problems are made possible and intelligible and how they are articulated, represented and constituted in policies (Bacchi & Goodwin 2016). By posing such questions, the analysis enables the researcher to probe the underlying assumptions: that there is a problem, how the problem is made intelligible and what implications policy might have for society and its citizens. In this report, we primarily adopted the “policy as text” approach in the initial mapping, while the “policy as discourse” approach will become more evident in the concluding discussions.

2.2 Institutional Logics and Hybrid Organizations

Rules are not always scripted into policy but also exist informally. The word institution can be understood from a variety of theoretical perspectives. When trying to understand the conditions for different organizational actors to engage in multiagency collaboration, we turn to the sociological perspective that describes an institution as a ”more-or-less taken-for-granted repetitive social behaviour that is underpinned by normative systems and cognitive understandings that give meaning to social exchange and thus enable self-producing social order” (Greenwood, Oliver, Suddaby & Sahlin, 2008, p. 4-5). Consequently, institutions are “the rules of the game” (Scott, 1995) - the regulative, normative and cultural orders and constraints that guide social behaviour in specific social spaces. They explain why students know to sit down in the classroom and wait for the teacher to start talking, why Westerners know to shake hands the first time they meet and why Scandinavians expect public authorities to be fair, objective and just. From this perspective, understanding multiagency collaboration becomes somewhat problematic as the actors in such collaborative structures come from different institutional orders. For example, we can expect the institutional arrangements within the police force to be somewhat different from teachers. To explain such institutional heterogeneity in social spaces, institutional logics has become a dominant theoretical framework in organization theory.
Institutional logics can be defined as:

socially constructed, historical patterns of cultural symbols and material practices, including assumptions, values, and beliefs, by which individuals and organizations provide meaning to their daily activity, organize time and space, and reproduce their life and experiences” (Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, p.2).

More simply put, an institutional logic constitutes the formal and informal rules that govern, or guide, the practitioner’s actions, interactions, and interpretations of situations. Thornton et al. (2012) claim that an institutional logic can be deconstructed by analysing particular elements of the logic. Collective identities provide answers to actors about whom they are and where they belong. The actor’s sense of belonging to a collective helps them to orient themselves and understand how to act in given situations. The connection to collective identities can be based on groups (for example ethnic, cultural, interest groups), professions/occupations (for example teachers and doctors), organizations, and industries. Goals are to be understood as what is desirable to achieve when you belong to a certain collective identity. For example, most teachers strive for their pupils to develop as human beings, improve and succeed in school. Strategies help actors to understand which situations they should act upon and how they should act. Each logic resorts to different solutions and answers in a given situation. Consequently, some solutions are available in one logic, while the same solutions are unavailable in another. The ground for attention explains why some questions/situations/problems are given a lot of attention in specific logics, while others are not. The ground for authority helps individuals to orientate themselves in decision-making. For example, some logics entail a more hierarchal, managerial order of decision-making, while others are more decentralized or collective in their decision-making. To sum up, an institutional logic helps an individual to understand which type of collective he/she belongs to, what that type of collective is striving to achieve, which problems/situations to focus on, which strategies and tools are appropriate to apply in relation to the problem/situation, and who decides what type of action is appropriate.
Thus, each professional organization has its own logics that result in certain scripts for how actors are expected to handle different situations. In the context of CVE, the police, schools and social services are public organizations that are guided by their respective institutional logics and thus different ideas on what should be done in CVE efforts, how it should be done and why it should be done. This results in a complex institutional environment where multiple institutional logics might be activated, competing or co-existing (Thornton et al., 2012). The multiagency units in focus for this project (SSP, SSP(f), SLT and Anchor teams), are thus constructed as new organizational units that are constituted from a variety of professionals that bring different institutional logics to the collaboration unit.

A collaboration unit that is constituted from different actors and logics can be understood as a form of hybrid organization. As Battilana, Besharov and Mitzinneck (2017) state, hybrids can be understood as organizations that “instantiate the values and practices associated with multiple distinct field- or societal-level logics” (p. 137). Since multiagency approaches are multi-disciplinary hybrids, they incorporate elements from diverse institutional logics and may be arenas for contradictions (Pache & Santos, 2013; Battilana & Dorado, 2010). Hence, tensions might arise and, as Battilana and Dorado (2010) argue, there are no “ready-to-wear” models for handling tensions that can occur as institutional logics are combined in hybrid organizations. Binder (2007) adds that “people are seldom engaged with one or two logics, but with multiple logics and with multiple ways of encountering those logics, on a continuum of almost purely universalistic to almost purely institutional” (ibid. p.567).

2.3 Methodology
– Making Policy Intelligible

The analytical work for this part of our project focuses on the policies that govern CVE efforts with a certain emphasis on multiagency approaches in the four Nordic countries. However, it is obvious that “Public policy and the problems with which it is concerned do not exist in neat, tidy academic boxes” (Parsons, 1995 p. 64). Comparative
analysis of different policy tends to be descriptive and give rough indications of differences and similarities (van Dongen, 2010). One problem is the notorious difficulties in applying the same variables to policy from different countries. For instance, actions and objectives in the Nordic action plans address various levels in society and are presented in different ways. In Denmark and Norway, actions and objectives are presented as prioritized areas followed by actions for the specific area, while the Finland’s plans formulate objectives as short term or long-term goals followed by actions. Sweden’s policy is found in different policies and various sources, and is mainly presented as actions at the national or local level.

Furthermore, there are hardly any studies or methodological approaches that can capture CVE policy in its entirety. Neither are there any universal or specified tool-boxes for policy analysis; in fact, there are reasons to avoid a tool-box approach and instead construct an analytical framework suited to the policy at hand and the objectives for the project. There is also every reason to avoid the black-box problem of not being transparent enough (Patton & Sawicki, 2012). Thus, systematic comparisons of policy call for a systematic approach that benefits from being inductive, transparent and constructed on the basis of empirical findings along with the stated objectives. One way to accomplish this is to use models and visual maps. These are intended to function as ways of thinking, or as explanatory frameworks (Parsons, 1995). To make comparisons possible and to create transparency, we have chosen to use policy documents (documents holding aims and measures for CVE, published or disseminated by governmental institutions) as the main source of information for this part of the project.

**Data: identification of relevant policies**

Policies and documents that regulate and govern CVE efforts are, as previously mentioned, in a state of continuous (re)negotiation, which means that new documents and policies were being produced while this policy part of the HEX-NA project was being conducted. One example of this is the report from the Swedish official commission of

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27 Some of these are enclosed as appendices.
inquiry into sharing information between agencies in counterterrorism collaborations, which was published in late 2018 (SOU 2018:65). The inquiry’s report provides suggestions and recommendations for future adjustments to legal frameworks; however, no decisions have been made (at this point in time). This means that we have to start from a certain point in time with the documents and policies that were available and accurate in autumn 2018 and early spring 2019. However, we have tried to incorporate changes and updates as they appeared and became official.

As a first step, relevant policy documents were identified by project partners in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, respectively. These documents follow the common organizational structures addressing state, national, regional or local level; thus policy from different levels of the organizational structures were incorporated. However, there are distinct differences between the local levels that make them notoriously difficult to compare. For instance, Denmark has 98 municipalities, Finland 311, Norway 356 (from 2020) and Sweden 290. While Denmark has three municipalities with less than 5000 inhabitants, in Norway there are 200 of these small municipalities. These internal differences make it hard to make valid local comparisons, so instead we have used local policies as examples of how multiagency work is portrayed and allegedly enacted.

Policy that governs established multiagency approaches, including legal frameworks, was also identified and collected together with evaluations and assessments connected to these forms of cooperation. In this instance, some of the documented initiatives deal directly with CVE, while others might be more indirect. In cases where uncertainties occurred, we consulted the project research team. To cover the organizational structure of CVE efforts and involved actors, we also include documentation concerned with CVE efforts carried out by civil society organizations. Hence, the identifying and collecting stage is inductive (Spickler, 2006).

The policy documents and laws are mainly written in Scandinavian languages (Danish, Norwegian and Swedish) and some of them are available in English versions. Some of the Finnish documents are also published in a Swedish version, and a few are translated into English.
This means that in some cases, only abstracts to policy were found in languages that the authors could read and understand. This might mean that some content from Finnish documents has been lost. However, we have received some help from our Finnish colleagues for translation and for validating our findings.

Selection of policy documents

Our selection of policy texts is based on the organizational (hierarchical) structures of the four Nordic countries. Thus, documents concerning national, regional and local policy for CVE are incorporated into the analysis. Criteria for inclusion are that the text should be publicly available, have a clear sender (government, agency or organization) and a defined target group and that they contain objectives, actions and measures for at least one of the agencies in focus here (school, social services and police).

The legal frameworks that could be seen as relevant for constraining and enabling information sharing in multiagency work to counter violent extremism are extensive. We have excluded the sections in each country’s Data Protection Act (or similar) that regulate the storage and collection of personal data, but included those that concern sharing of information for preventive purposes. Public Access to Information and Secrecy Acts and Data Protection Acts, with some limitations, do not forbid government agencies to exchange information once a crime has been committed or is imminent. Hence, we are interested in the legislation that concerns preventive (not reactive) efforts that target individuals (not larger groups or communities). Below, we offer a list of the criteria for inclusion:

1. The mapping concerns legislation that directly deals with information sharing between government agencies for preventive purposes in relation to individuals

2. We have chosen a performative approach that focuses on the legislation that the involved agencies find to be relevant in relation to multiagency collaboration and information sharing in CVE efforts
3. The focus of the analysis is on what kind of information, for what purpose, is shared between which government agencies and in which direction the information flows.

We have chosen not to include sections that repeat the constraints on and possibilities for information sharing expressed by a more general law. For example, we have not included a section in the Finnish Basic Education Act that regulates professional secrecy if the same content is found in the Act on Publicity in Government Agencies. In such cases, were we have found a section in a specific Act that adds to or complements a generally applying provision, we have included it in the survey.

Limitations

Lastly, but importantly, our analysis is focused on the content found in policy and laws. This means that we do not have the access nor the objective to explore how these are put into practice. The focus on policy also means that there are other solutions and local variations in multiagency approaches and the actors involved than those mentioned in the analysed documents and publications. As Willumsen (2008) concluded, policy documents and various legislation represent a top-down approach that regulates aspects of collaboration in order to ensure the rights of the service user. “However, collaboration between the parties is not initiated until a ‘case’ arises that requires collaboration for mutual efforts” (ibid. p.361). The enactment of policy is elaborated on in more detail in the third part of the HEX-NA research project which focuses on the practical work of the multiagency teams.

Also, detailed instructions on how to implement the legislation and the reasoning behind it is usually found in the legislative history and official commissions of inquiry leading up to the adoption of legislation. Other useful data to analyse would be the judicial practice connected to the legislation, which would inform us about how the legislation is applied. Such an extensive juridical analysis however goes beyond the scope and limitations of this report. The findings should therefore be read taking these limitations into consideration.
Coding

In our coding, we have focused on two layers of the data. The first layer is descriptive and focuses on the textual content of the policies (policy as text). The second layer has an interpretive approach, in which the textual content of the policies is analysed from a discursive point of view. In order to address policy within the three areas in focus: Organizational structures, Legal frameworks and Recommended practices - we develop and elaborate on instruments for initial systematic coding for each area. The objective for our different sets of analytical coding is to fit the model to the problem, not the problem to the model and in line with Ockham’s razor, to use the simplest model that will do the job (Walker, 2000).

For organizational structures, we use a strategic tool based on the Pentad analysis model developed by Kenneth Burke (1969). Burke's Pentad analysis was initially done to tease out motives and rests on five aspects of interaction or dramatic episodes in texts, namely: act, agency, actor, scene and purpose. With elaborations on the possible questions to ask, making them more suitable for policy texts, and not enactments of them, these are the factors that go well with the objective of mapping out organizational structures (see table 1.). In our version, this is mainly used for mapping out the policy that regulates the multiagency approaches in focus.
Table 1: Modified Pentad analysis

For recommended practices, our objectives are to map out and compare the recommendations made in national policy regarding multiagency approaches. This puts the focus on the act, agency, actors and scene of the work. As a first step, the sections where multiagency approaches are mentioned or referred to in the documents are singled out. Since the policies, action plans, handbooks and recommendations are numerous and target different levels of the prevention structures, we address both national policies and policies aimed directly at multiagency approaches. In search of policy concerned with practical work and recommendations for a successful collaboration, it is evident that the police are the richest source of information, as they often produce handbooks and recommendations for national, regional or local police forces. The handbooks and recommended practices are presented for the four Nordic countries separately, followed by a joint analytical discussion of the practices that were found.

In order to analyse how multiagency approaches are advocated, the national action plans are regarded as the main source of information and we have focused on a joint Nordic perspective. Thus, we identified common themes in how these practices are advocated by asking the question: how is this made legitimate and relevant? What are the alleged
benefits of multiagency approaches? This means that it is mainly the purpose section of the pentad analysis that is utilized. This coding was initially done at the national level, and then summarized, compared and discussed in a joint Nordic perspective.

For legal frameworks, the national legal frameworks are mapped out, compared and analysed in three broad sections: (1) legal incentives in the Police Acts for collaboration and prevention; (2) obstacles to information sharing; (3) possibilities for information sharing. Given the fact that legal texts are rather scant and do not include the background, reasoning and motivation, a discursive analysis becomes difficult to perform. Hence, this chapter is highly descriptive. The data is presented in a table in order to visualize the similarities and differences between the Nordic countries.
3. Organizational Structures

In scholarly literature, there are some distinctions made between interagency and multiagency approaches. The former is about agencies which to some degree merge at a practitioner level, while the latter is used when various agencies come together to address a problem (Burnett & Appleton, 2004). Of course, there are many different forms of multiagency approaches for addressing various problems. However, one common denominator is a shared understanding that a joint approach could diminish overlaps between services, promote the pooling of resources and reducing potential risks (Vanhanen & Heikkilä, 2017). One of the main arguments for these approaches is that they afford easy access to expertise and agencies that traditionally handle problems separately. By organizing multiagency teams and structures, pools of service and skills can combine forces while duplication of efforts, inconsistencies and differences in emphasis can be avoided (ibid. p.34).

In order to combine expertise from different institutions that handle or meet young individuals in their everyday work, new organizational arenas and multiagency approaches are developed. One important objective for creating such arenas is that they allow access to a broader repertoire of institutional expertise that can be utilized and combined in a number of ways (Pache & Santos 2013). Thus, they fit the definition of being hybrid organizations, meaning that they are
organizational structures that combine elements from separate institutional logics or discursive rationalities (Pache & Santos, 2013; Battilana & Dorado, 2010). The multiagency approaches in focus for this study consist mainly of collaborations between schools, social services and the police. An organization structured as a hybrid space or arena means that initial tasks and objectives for the collaboration need to be established and agreed upon; otherwise there is a risk of each agency sticking to their traditional objectives, which might jeopardize the collaboration. Following Willumsen (2008) and Binder (2010), it is also worth mentioning that besides the professional agencies working together at an inter-organizational level, multiagency teams are also interpersonal collaborations between individuals with different personal and professional expertise, skills, ethics and experiences. Furthermore, civil society organizations and NGOs are often included, which makes the hybridity of interagency collaborations even more hybrid. Even if these organizations and associations are ascribed significant importance, they are not governed by the same legal and professional frameworks as public institutions and their actors.

In order to map out similarities and differences in the organizational structures and legislative frameworks of the multiagency approaches in the four Nordic countries as hybrid areas or spaces, we initially describe the organizational approaches for countering violent extremism in Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland separately. In doing this, we have used the structure of the pentad analysis, which enables further analysis of discursive approaches in the different countries. This might contribute an understanding the institutional logics of the multiagency approaches in the different Nordic countries.

The mapping of organizational structures in this section of the report also situates and describes the SSP/SSP(f)/SLT or Anchor team approaches within the different national structures. It also showcases some of the additional services that work as special units meant to support the cooperation in handling issues related to violent extremism and radicalization. This section is then concluded and briefly discussed in terms of the opportunities and challenges for the Nordic multiagency approaches.
3.1 Denmark

In Denmark, the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing is the governing body the Danish Centre for Prevention of Extremism\textsuperscript{28}, which supports preventive efforts in the municipalities, crime prevention bodies, educational institutions, housing organizations, CSOs and others. The Centre is also responsible for counselling other relevant actors in producing action plans in the area, and for providing training for professionals who are working in the prevention area. At the national level, the Danish Centre for Prevention of Extremism is joined by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET, Politiets Efterretningstjeneste) and the Danish Police’s National Prevention Centre (NFC, Rigspolitiet\textsuperscript{\textregistered} Nationale Forebyggelsescenter), which come under the Ministry of Justice. These actors are responsible for providing multiagency units with relevant skills and actions when needed. Also, within the Ministry of Education the board of Education and Quality (STUK, Styrelsen for Undervisning og Kvalitet) supports and guides educational institutions in how to work to strengthen democratic citizenship and critical skills and to handle concerns for extremism and radicalization.

The Danish approach to violent extremism and radicalization according to Hemmingsen, 2015) is anchored in two agendas. “One is the protection of the state and society against terrorist attacks, while the other is the welfare state’s responsibility for the individual’s well-being, which obliges it to protect the individual against self-harming behavior” (ibid. p.15).

The Danish action plan (DK, 2016) explicitly positions collaboration and common understandings between authorities at the core of preventive efforts (ibid. p. 6). The prioritized areas in the action plan are centred around the strengthening of existing bodies, including the police, municipalities, schools and international collaboration. The strengthening also refers to more concrete measures, and consequences for disseminating extremist propaganda, for foreign

\textsuperscript{28} National Center for Forebyggelse af Extremisme. (2019). Hvem gør hvad i Danmark?. [available 2019-06-17 https://stopekstremisme.dk/forebyggelsesindsats/hvem-gor-hvad-i-danmark]
fighters and more consistent interventions in criminal milieus. Furthermore, it states that the prevention of extremism and radicalization is based on the crime prevention framework, but that it has been developed into a separate focus area within this framework.

**Danish SSP**

In Denmark, multiagency approaches for prevention in different institutional areas have existed since 1977 (Det kriminalpræventive råd - DKR, 2012). SSP is described as an interdisciplinary collaboration between Schools, Social services and the police, aimed at general crime prevention. The national action plan (DK, 2016) highlights that the crime prevention collaborations between authorities are mainly for that purpose. And that SSP and other multiagency forms of collaboration can “draw on methods from the fields of social work and healthcare to prevent radicalisation” (Ibid. p.14).

SSP collaboration have been the inspiration to what is called the Aarhus model of radicalization prevention. According to Bertelen (2015), the Aarhus model is:

(R)ooted in solid experience and know-how. The SSP organization provides a formal platform embracing exactly those institutions, resource networks and employees who are able to meet the particular needs of young people (ibid. p.242).

Multiagency approaches like SSP are an important part of CVE interventions in Denmark; Rambøll (2018) shows that SSP is the most prevalent form used in organizing local preventive actions. The starting point for SSP cooperation between Schools, Social services and the Police was the need for early multiagency preventive actions for children and young people at risk of ending up in criminal activity or drug abuse. Thus, the main objective for Denmark’s SSP efforts is crime prevention, and is thus placed in the middle section of the preventive pyramid.

Like CVE efforts in general, the SSP collaborative model is divided into three levels: (1) activities targeting children and young people in general; (2) specific activities targeting children and young people at
risk; and (3) individual activities targeting children and young people who have exhibited criminal behaviour.

The organizational structure of SSP cooperation has three levels; a structure that aligns the political level and the executive level with the operational level (practice).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency level</th>
<th>Involved actors</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area council - in 12 police districts (Kredsråd)</strong></td>
<td>Chief of police and city mayor, key actors such as representatives from the probation service, healthcare system and psychiatry and SSP coordinators are invited to participate on a regular basis, others when needed.</td>
<td>Develop strategic aims and priorities, frameworks and regulations for areas of action and intervention. Discuss cooperation between the police and the local community. Provide overviews of the local area and share information with relevant actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local council (Lokalråd)</strong></td>
<td>There are differences between municipalities. Relevant actors include civil society organizations, representatives from government agencies and institutions and municipal administrations. The police chief and SSP consultant are most often involved. Other actors may be involved ad hoc.</td>
<td>Operationalize decisions made in the area council, coordinate SSP efforts and ensure that prevention efforts are in line with policy frameworks (child, health and abuse policies). The local council is responsible for local assessments of needs and for developing local strategies for SSP. Coordinate cooperation in the local community and align the local council with the operational level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational level SSP (Udførende niveau)</strong></td>
<td>Actors directly working with young people in the municipality such as the police, social workers, youth workers and teachers. Other relevant actors may be involved ad hoc.</td>
<td>Operationalize decisions made in the local council. Assess needs among young people in the local community who require interventions. Inform about local individual or collective needs for support. Responsible for involving young individuals and families in crime prevention activities. Explore the need for methods and actions to be used in primary prevention.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Organization of Danish SSP.

According to DKR (2012), the operational level is based on local network groups related to schools. These operational units are allegedly
better positioned to observe and detect signals among young people in the local community.

Additional Services

As a special unit supporting the SSP, the Info houses are not actual physical buildings but serve as “preventive hubs” anchored regionally in (12) police districts. The Info houses function as centres for sharing knowledge and expertise, and a forum where the police and municipal actors in the area can discuss methods, actions and challenges in general preventive work and specific cases. The Info houses are “centers of excellence concerning extremism and radicalization” (Hemmingsen, 2015, p.27).

The objectives of the Info houses also include to initiate preventive efforts on behalf of the police or the municipalities. One of the missions of the Info houses is to assess the referred cases and decide if these are cases of violent radicalization or a relatively harmless case of “legal radicalization”, “youth rebellion” or simply individuals in need of other measures (Bertelsen, 2015, p.243). If there are no security issues, the cases are referred to municipal services for further action. If there are then these cases fall within ordinary welfare services such as career counselling, therapy or housing but also services specifically related to violent extremism. For those in need of some form of intervention, mentoring is an essential element (Bertelsen, 2015). A mentor can play a crucial role in a dis-engagement and/or de-radicalization process as well as act as a guide in the ordinary struggles of everyday life. The website for the Aarhus municipality (2018)²⁹ informs citizens about the services of the Info houses, and these are listed as counselling and guidance, parent network, workshop for young people, Syria preparedness (Syriensberedskab), mentor support and EXIT. Also, the Aarhus municipality states that the Info houses are linked to policemen with special experience who are in constant contact with co-workers within the region.

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In some municipalities, there are SSP consultants who are involved in the local council. The SSP consultant is described as a bridge builder, coordinator, source of inspiration, and communicator of information (DKR, 2012). The role of the consultant is to make sure that the right expertise is involved, that relevant knowledge is shared and that new methods and ideas are introduced. The SSP consultants’ association (SSP Samrådet) serves all municipalities working with SSP as a model. The association has 12 areas which are the same as the police districts (DKR, 2012). The SSP consultants’ association has a sub-committee focused on prevention of extremism and exit processes.

### 3.2 Finland

In Finland, policies on counter-terrorism and countering “violent radicalization” are somewhat intertwined. The Finnish counter-terrorism strategy state that “Counter-terrorism in Finland is based on cooperation and partnership among all authorities and societal actors” (Ministry of the Interior, 2018, p.14). One of the fundamental principles of prevention in the Finnish action plan is the interaction between different authorities, organizations and communities. Such multiagency cooperation is assumed to contribute up-to-date awareness of the situation and contribute various means and solutions.

> No single authority organisation possesses the means to put a stop to the radicalisation process among individuals or groups on its own. When the different practitioners collaborate, they also gain access to a wide range of instruments (FI, 2016, p. 14).

With the multiagency approach as a fundamental principle, one of the short-term goals for actions is to (up until the end of 2018) establish national and local structures and procedures for multi-professional cooperation; making it possible for authorities, organizations and communities to prevent violent radicalization and extremism. In December 2018, a press release from the Ministry of the Interior stated that the new police strategy would have an increased focus on preventive efforts, aiming at engendering a sense of security and a

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30 SSP Samrådet web page: [available 2019-02-05 at http://ssp-samraadet.dk/ ]
decrease in the financial and human burden of crimes and disruptions. Two of the main themes for the strategy are to further develop the activities of the Anchor teams and to broaden the cooperation with educational sectors.\(^{31}\)

### Finnish Ankkuri - the Anchor team approach

The Finnish Anchor team approach was initially established as a project in 2004 and is very much inspired by the Danish Aarhus model, trying “to be the anchor for young people who drift away” (Lenos & Keltjens 2017). Its purpose is to offer seamless services and to accelerate interventions for adolescents in need of support and to offer a client-based service (Ministry of the Interior, 2013; 2014). The Ankkuri approach is described as an intersectoral early intervention model (FI, 2016 p.19), consisting of mixed teams of professionals collaborating at the local level (Ministry of the Interior 2014).

The Anchor team approach is firmly tied to the police, which has a special responsibility for preventing and countering radicalization and extremism, thus all police departments must carry out activities in accordance with the Anchor team model (FI, 2016 p. 27). According to a press release from the Ministry of the Interior, a multi-professional Anchor team is “made up of a police officer, a social worker, a psychiatric nurse, in some parts of Finland, even a youth worker” (ibid. p.2). However, the capacity of the Anchor team model in different cities and settings is reliant on the local operating environment and circumstances and operates at three levels: minimum, basic and high. The Finnish Anchor team approach distinguishes between multiagency work and multi-professional work. The latter refers to professionals working together in established teams while multiagency work refers to professionals coming together on a case-by-case basis “whilst working and residing in their respective organizations” (Nordic

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Council of Ministers 2017, p. 45). The 2017 annual report that evaluates the national action plan underlines the need for local actors to know who to contact in cases of concern for the situation or behaviour of a particular individual. “The contact point can be the Anchor team or a contact person indicated by the city or the police” (Ministry of the Interior, 2017 p.13).

In the Handbook for the Anchor model (Moilanen, Airaksinen & Kangasniemi for the Ministry of the Interior, 2019), the objectives of multi-professional work are to prevent crimes and strengthen the wellbeing of young individuals; to offer young people and their families appropriate help at the right time; to support participation and prevent exclusion; and to prevent and identify radicalization resulting in violent extremism and in that way strengthen internal security through early intervention.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency level</th>
<th>Involved Actors</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anchor steering group</td>
<td>Police chief or major</td>
<td>Establishing Anchor team efforts in the area, coordinating the work in a shared understanding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle managers, steering group</td>
<td>Managers from the police, social services, youth work and the health sector.</td>
<td>Responsible for the coordination and evaluation of Anchor team efforts. Ensuring that the teams have adequate resources for doing their work, including guidance and support from management. Define target groups for the Anchor teams, make sure that the team is aware of, and follows the legislation and guidelines for sharing information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots or shop floor level</td>
<td>Police officer, social worker, youth worker, nurse.</td>
<td>Operational work in shared office premises.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Organization of Anchor team efforts.

Additional services

In 2016, a cooperation network was established between the police and the mayors of the capital region (Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa and Kauniainen). The cooperation network is meant to ensure that
“radicalised individuals living in the region, or one about to become radicalised, will not be left without the appropriate support merely because of the red tape” (Ministry of the Interior, 2017 p. 21). The network is to ensure that there are effective structures in place for monitoring and handling violent extremism and to exchange information about the current situation in the region. As of 2019, there is a new multiagency group in Finland for handling single cases of individuals returning from conflict areas. The group consists of representatives from SUPO (Finnish security intelligence service), KPR (National Bureau of Investigation), the police and other related authorities.

3.3 Norway

The set of actors involved in Norwegian actions for preventing extremism is broad. According to Bjørgo and Gjelsvik (2015), the emphasis in CVE efforts in Norway is on preventive measures rather than repressive, thus the problem is not considered to be an issue for the police and the security services only. One important actor is The regional resource center for violence, traumatic stress and suicide prevention (RVTS), which is divided into five regions and have a key role in disseminating knowledge about extremism, radicalization and prevention to a broad range of local agencies and civil society organizations. In the police strategy for crime prevention, mobilization, involvement and mutual cooperation are key factors in prevention and this is one of the reasons for expanding SLT initiatives (ibid. p,13). The Norwegian action plan commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security (hereafter NO, 2014) states that “early preventative efforts are a responsibility that rests with many sectors of society” (ibid. p.7.). Furthermore, it states that “General preventative efforts in many different fields can also help prevent people from choosing violence as a means of achieving their ideological or religious goals” (ibid. p.7). The plan emphasizes that preventive work requires

33 We interpret “red tape” as limits on sharing information (confidentiality) between organizations.
34 De regionale resurssentrene om vold, traumatisk stress og selvmodsforebygging. [available 2019-10-02 at: https://rvts.no/]
35 Justis og beredskapsdepartementet]
interdisciplinary efforts and thinking, along with established local cooperative models where the municipalities, the Police Council and the SLT model work together.

**Norwegian SLT**

Norway’s SLT model (Samordning av Lokale rus og kriminalitets-forebyggende Tiltak/Coordination of local preventive efforts against drugs and criminality), is according to National Crime Prevention Council (KRÅD, 2011) similar to the Danish SSP model (in 2015 the KRÅD was reorganized into the Center for crime prevention). A report (NIBR, 2016:12) states that even though the SLT model has a wider preventive and promotive purpose, it is central in local efforts against extremism and radicalization. It should also be noted that only about half of the municipalities in Norway have implemented SLT with dedicated SLT coordinators (though some have only part-time functions). This is probably due to the number and size of municipalities in Norway. Thus, it should be recognized that 76% of Norwegian citizens live in the larger municipalities that have SLT, and that in October 2019, there are 190 SLT-coordinators.

SLT is a model for cooperation that primarily (according to KRÅD recommendations) handles cases involving children and young people under 18. In some municipalities, it is expanded to cover persons up to age 23 and occasionally older individuals have been included (some municipalities include individuals of all ages in their SLT model). SLT involves actors representing the municipalities, police and other government agencies. Civil society organizations and local enterprises can also be involved in SLT. The model is intended to coordinate knowledge and resources between the police and relevant municipal units. Also, SLT is recommended by the Norwegian Crime Preventive Council (KRÅD, 2011) as a structure to steer and increase the efficiency of preventive efforts (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2011).

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36 KRÅD = Det Kriminalitetsforebyggande Råd [National Crime Prevention Council]
37 Senter for kriminalitetsforebygging
38 Kompetanser for kriminalitetsforebygging. [available 2019-10-02 at: http://kriminalitetsforebygging.no/slt/slt-koordinatorer-2/]
The organization is based on three levels that allocate the responsibilities for governance, coordination and implementation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency level</th>
<th>Involved actors</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Steering committee**  
*(Styrings-gruppe)* | Chief of police, the municipality, SLT coordinator, and/or police council. | The steering committee use their authority to safeguard the implementation of SLT. The task of the steering committee are to set up clear objectives for drug and crime prevention and to make sure these are implemented in the municipal action plans; have relevant knowledge in the field in which SLT is operating; coordinate the network within the municipality. |
| **Coordination group**  
*(Koordineringsgruppe)* | Head of agencies/groups from the municipality and police with the authority to make decisions and with knowledge of the challenges related to their respective areas. | The coordination group makes decisions and allocates resources according to the frameworks set by the steering committee; highlight problems and challenges in their local community; provides knowledge on how challenges and problems can be handled; makes sure that each sector contributes knowledge and expertise and that these are put into practice; ensures that resources are used efficiently. |
| **Working committee**  
*(Utførende)* | Actors directly working with young people through SLT in the municipality, police, schools, health services and civil society (such as volunteer organizations, faith communities, local enterprises). | Drugs abuse and crime prevention in practice. The working committee puts the objectives from the steering committee into practice and needs to have close and good communications with the coordinating group. |

**Table 4.** Organization of SLT.
Additional Services

It is voluntary for the municipalities to establish a police council (Politiråd). It can be formed as cooperation between the local police and municipal authorities for the purpose of crime prevention and 99% of the Norwegian municipalities have such councils (Ramboll, 2014). The objective is to promote cooperation on general crime prevention and security in local communities. The police council is a forum for executives in the police and municipalities and handles general issues for citizens, while the SLT is primarily concerned with children and young individuals (KRÅD, 2011). It is common, but not mandatory, to use the police council as a steering committee for SLT. An evaluation of the police council (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet 2014) shows that more than half of the municipalities in Norway apply an organization where the police council is also the SLT steering committee. This is for instance the case in Fredrikstad (Politiet øst Politidistrikt, 2018), while in Oslo the mayor is the director of the police council with the chief of police as vice director (Politiet Oslo politidistrikt, 2018).

SLT coordinators are responsible for the local coordination of SLT. For instance, in the municipality of Oslo there are 15 SLT coordinators representing each part of the city and they function as the secretaries of the regional steering groups. The coordinators also participate in municipal agency sections (Politiet Oslo Politidistrikt, 2018). An evaluation from the Norwegian Police University College (PHS, 2008) shows that the most common position for SLT-coordinators is a placement within the city mayors staff and that this is the most valued position since it gives an overview of levels and actors available in the municipality. Fredrikstad is a much smaller municipality than Oslo, have two SLT coordinators they are the driving forces in the mission to make different municipal instances and organisations to cooperate in preventing crime (Politiet øst Distrikt, 2018). The evaluation of the National actionplan from 2017, states that these municipalities are satisfied with their SLT work and that the SLT coordinator is of specific importance for aligning the efforts of the steering committee and the working committee (Justis og Beredskapsdepartementet, 2017). Even though this may not be true for
all of the coordinators, the evaluation from PHS (2008) highlights the coordination of crime preventive actions as crucial. It also concludes that though the main mission for the SLT coordinators is to initiate measures in the SLT-work, the “administrative work appears to be the most adequate description of what is actually being done” (ibid. p. 11). The SLT coordinators main partners on a local level is connected to the preventive police officers. These may be single officers dedicated to preventive work, or larger preventive police units is some cities.

Such units are concerned with cases involving individuals under 18. Their main tasks include general youth crime and delinquency (gangs, drugs, violence etc.) but also extremism. Much of what they do may be considered as social prevention. Preventive police officers try to intervene before a crime has been committed, usually in collaboration with other agencies. In cases related to extremism and radicalization, they work closely with the regional police radicalization contacts. Except collaboration with coordinators on different levels, the preventive units can work together with schools and civils society organizations in order to prevent crime.

In addition, preventive radicalization contacts (Radikaliseringsskontakter) are established in “relevant police districts” (NO, 2014, p.20) and function as contacts between the security police (PST) and the local collaborating parties. According to the 2017 evaluation of the action plan (Justis og beredskapsdepartementet, 2017), radicalization contacts are now established in all police districts. The radicalization contacts have an advisory function in the police council and SLT. However, the evaluation also shows that there are relatively few cases handled that concern radicalization or extremism.

### 3.4 Sweden

Sweden’s CVE policy has undergone some organizational and discursive shifts during the last few years and the responsibility for

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handling issues concerning violent extremism has been transferred. In addition, action plans and strategic policies have been evaluated, revised and replaced. In comparison with other national strategies, Sweden has previously put more rhetorical emphasis on long-term strengthening and safeguarding of democracy than on security measures. One example of this is that the responsibility for actions against violent extremism and the former National Coordinator against Violent Extremism was placed under the Ministry of Culture. Even if the national coordinator function is now replaced by the Center Against Violent Extremism (CVE), the ministry is still responsible for the Swedish Agency for Youth and Civil Society (MUCF), which amongst other things, supports and finances projects that aim to safeguard democracy against violent extremism.

In Sweden, (in autumn 2019) there are no specific responsibilities for CVE efforts placed at the regional level. County administration boards cooperate with the seven police territories on crime prevention and these territories coordinate smaller police districts or local police units.

In the Swedish case, local actors like first-line personnel (professionals working within education, afterschool leisure centres, social services, healthcare services and local police) are often described as key actors in prevention. Civil society organizations and faith communities are also believed to play a crucial part in prevention work. One fundamental aspect of this solution is that for vulnerable individuals or for children and young people, mutual trust and emotional or social bonds are necessary for making individuals feel safe and protected (Sivenbring, 2018).

**Swedish SSP(f)**

Even though SSP(f) is briefly described in SOU (2013:81), there are no national regulations or recommendations for the establishment of specific multiagency approaches as in Denmark for instance. However, there other forms of multiagency approaches besides SSP(f), for instance SIG\(^{40}\) (Social action groups) which are locally organized in municipalities. The SIG and SSP(f) teams are generally based on the

\(^{40}\) [SIG = Social Insats Grupp]
same foundation and their aim is crime prevention. The difference is that SIG teams are interagency collaborations (Burnett & Appleton, 2004), as they are put together based on individual cases and assessments of the needs of a particular individual (National Board of Health and Welfare, 2016). The SIG are also organized and coordinated by social services.

Organizing SSP(f) efforts at the local level is dependent on collaboration agreements between the police and social services in the municipalities. While being frequently mentioned in policy on CVE, it remains unclear how many municipalities in Sweden actually use SSP(f) as a multiagency structure for handling violent extremism. According to the Swedish Police (2013), Gothenburg, Uppsala and Malmö have established SSP (f) cooperation. However, in the Police publication (2017) *Support for crime preventive work* a functioning SSP(f) or SIG is framed as a proven effective foundation for handling young people at risk of becoming radicalized.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency level</th>
<th>Involved actors</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local steering group or central cooperation team</strong></td>
<td>SSP(f) coordinators from local divisions of the city, Executives from involved agencies. Headed by social services.</td>
<td>Organization and control of the cooperation, responsible for frameworks, objectives and evaluation. Providing support and information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Executive group (Ledningsgrupp)</strong></td>
<td>Heads of agencies/groups, unit leaders, youth police, school principals, from the municipality and police.</td>
<td>Coordination, planning and allocation of actions and interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operative team (Operativt team)</strong></td>
<td>Actors directly working with young people through SSP(f) in the municipality, police and civil society</td>
<td>Operational work, everyday relational and social actions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Organization of SSP(f).

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41 Våldsbejakande extremism. Ett stöd i det förebyggande arbetet.
Additional services

The 290 municipalities have the legal and financial responsibility for local social services such as childcare, schools, social welfare services, afterschool leisure centres, etc. Thus, the municipalities and local initiatives play a significant role in the governance of society. This is also the case for prevention of violent extremism, as responsibilities formulated on a national level are more or less shifted to the local level. All municipalities have been encouraged (by the former national coordinator) to develop local action plans for handling violent extremism and to appoint a coordinator responsible for the local coordination of preventive actions in each municipality. However, studies have shown that not only are these plans often missing, but the work tends to defeat the objectives of preventing extremism, as it lacks alignment with local assessments of existing problems and instead relies on national assessments. Thus, these plans sometimes miss the mark of making local prevention effective or even possible (Andersson Malmros & Mattsson 2017).

In November 2015, the (former) Swedish national coordinator decided to set up and pilot municipal Kunskapshus (Knowledge centres) in the municipalities of Stockholm, Örebro, Gothenburg and Borlänge. These were meant to serve as coordinating hubs for safeguarding democracy by preventing radicalization and the development of violent extremist milieus (SOU 2017:110). These centres are managed and organized by the different municipalities and like the Danish Info houses and the Dutch Veiligheidsbuis (security centre) that have inspired these organizations, they should be seen as a function rather than a physical building. Their objective is to develop and optimize municipal and regional resources in order to strengthen local CVE efforts. Furthermore, they serve as an entry point for the municipalities concerning issues related to violent extremism and are intended to make a contribution through coordinating local support for individuals who want to leave violent milieus, and for their relatives. Another specific objective given by the (former) National coordinator is that the knowledge centres are expected to cooperate with civil society.
organizations in their work with defectors and their relatives. In addition, they are intended to enhance democratic practices through citizen dialogues, theme days, youth and family activities, etc. (Axelson & Stier, 2017).

The evaluation conducted by Axelson and Stier (2017) with colleagues, shows that the knowledge centres in the four cities have chosen different organizational settings; this is most evident when viewing who the involved actors are and who are regarded as external resources to the Kunskapshus. In Örebro and Gothenburg, the local coordinators work with the police and social services while in Borlänge, only the local CVE coordinator is involved, and Stockholm did not use the designation (Kunskapshus) at all. Overall, the evaluation shows that the knowledge centres have acted effectively where they have occurred, especially when different actors and agencies have worked together. However, there have been uncertainties and tensions between the different preventive perspectives focusing on socio-political measures on the one hand, and security measures on the other.

3.5 Civil Society

A mapping of knowledge about the prevention of extremism, commissioned by the Danish Centre for Prevention of Extremism (2018) defines approaches to prevention and shows that civil society constitutes a major part of these approaches. Support and guidance, information and education of citizens, the inclusion of family and social networks, and the involvement of civil society organizations are highlighted as potential ways to strengthen prevention against violent extremism. The Danish national action plan (DK, 2016) frequently mentions and involves civil society and affirms that all contributors to society are important to ensuring a positive development “from authorities to parents, families and civil society (ibid. p 3).

Among these civil society actors and their associations and organizations, faith communities are often included and so are families and relatives. As these actors are voluntary and often driven by ideology, there are few ways to govern or frame their efforts. As stated in the Swedish report SOU (2017:110) “Civil society has no legal
obligation to prevent violent extremism, but often has the will and
unique possibilities to do so” (p.94). Instead, a way to incorporate these
actors, and gain access to their very important services, is to support
them financially or to provide them with knowledge and training.
Another way to buy into their services is to give them responsibility for
providing knowledge and education for local communities. Through
responsibilities, accountability, financial support or grants, there are
also some incentives to measure and assess the work being done.

Measures that are intended to strengthen civil society and its
preparedness to handle violent extremism can be regarded as
safeguarding, democratizing or resilience building practices. To achieve
this, governmental agencies and departments offer grants for projects
that focus on preventive work. In Sweden, for instance, the Swedish
Agency for Youth and Civil Society [MUCF] and funds like Arvsfonden offer
generous grants for projects that are aiming at safeguarding democracy
against violent extremism and radicalization (Sivenbring 2016;
Andersson, 2017; Herz 2019; Mattsson & Sivenbring 2019). In
Norway, the Ministry of Culture offers financial support for organizations
and projects that use dialogue approaches and projects that can
contribute to developing knowledge and forums for dialogue about
political issues related to faith and belief systems (Justis og
beredskapsdepartementet 2017, p.9). Such democratizing measures can
also be about offering training and disseminating knowledge among
civil society organizations.

The Norwegian police (National Police Directorate, 2018)
acknowledge the importance of working with civil society and that
establishing such collaborations is an important mission for preventive
police contacts, the police council and SLT (ibid. p, 8). Likewise, the
Danish KRÅD (2012) include housing, sports clubs and local
enterprise as potential partners in SSP collaboration. The Swedish
report SOU (2017:110) explicitly places SSP(f) agency and civil society
actors at the core of safeguarding democracy against violent
extremism. The use of civil society organizations in social work has
previously gained little attention in public debate about preventing and
countering extremism (Herz 2019). One reason might be that there are
few possibilities for drawing any valid and reliable conclusions about
the efficacy of the democratizing actions and measures that these
organizations and associations have long been focusing on. There are simply few reliable quantitative possibilities or measurements available to show how values and attitudes change through interventions. However, there are many individuals who, in their everyday work or through their work in civil society organizations, meet with young people at risk, and who actively intervene in order to prevent those young people from coming to harm or doing harm to others.

They deserve strong support that rests on a stable foundation. Many of them have been involved long before we started talking about violent extremism, and they have knowledge and experience based on many years of good work. We believe that this work is often overlooked for the purpose of finding rapid and apparently effective ways of coming up with solutions for problems that have developed over many years. (Andersson Malmros & Mattsson, 2017, p.76).

Appendix 1 in this report shows some of the formulations that underline the importance of civil society organizations mentioned in national action plans, investigations or from evaluations and updates.

CSOs: Offering alternatives, adding to, and making up for a lack of, social services

Obviously, civil society and its organizations are defined as relevant actors in that they serve as neutral arenas where young individuals can meet, connect and find purpose and meaningful activities to be involved in. The Danish National Action Plan (DK, 2016) acknowledges that civil society organizations and associations can contribute to increasing resilience, even when that is not the main purpose of these activities (ibid. p.32). Associations and organizations that offer activities are often run by adults and organizers who can serve as significant others for young people in need of guidance. The importance of a sense of identity and belonging is something that these

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actors can offer that official agencies and institutions often cannot offer.

CSOs are thought to be able to promote positive environments in their local communities and on the Internet and, as a positive alternative, are framed as a chance to weaken the appeal and attraction of extremist milieus. In order to strengthen the non-governmental or civil society organizations in their work, an NGO-run centre has been established (DK, 2016). The centre welcomes members of the public who have concerns about radicalization, either for themselves or for someone they know. The centre offers a lot of the services that public authorities are traditionally responsible for, such as counselling and support, promoting positive personal development, assisting in finding work, accommodation or applying for a place in higher education. The Danish Agency for International Recruitment and Integration (SIRI) offers skills enhancement and capacity-building programmes targeting local associations and individuals working in them, who are given an “intensive training and counselling programme, where they receive guidance on activities that will help to attract and retain children and young people in the communal activities of associations” (DK, 2016 p.21).

Another important mission for CSOs is to fill the void when there is no available support or guidance offered by municipal or other local services for concerned relatives and friends. Dryden (2018) points to the sometimes misleading conviction that professional actors are always best suited to protecting and supporting individuals in need, while relatives and friends might have better chances of getting access. This is also acknowledged in the report from a Swedish government official commission of inquiry (SOU 2017:110) which stated that such support is of great relevance but that public service support and guidance for relatives and friends is generally missing (ibid. p.93). Furthermore, the investigation acknowledges that civil society organizations have the ability to build trust that authorities and municipal actors are often lacking. “Cooperation with civil society actors is therefore a prerequisite for effective preventive work” (SOU 2017:110, p.118). Support from local institutions and from local organizations can be crucial and necessary for helping relatives and
friends to find ways of handling and caring for their young ones who are at risk or in trouble (Aasgard 2017).

As an example of how CSOs and NGOs can be mobilised to handle specific services, the Red Cross in Sweden was contracted to set up a telephone help-line to counter radicalization (Mattsson, Arvidson Lebidinski & Johansson 2015). In 2016, this task was handed over to Save the children who operated it until the end of 2018. The help-line received a number of calls from professionals from the multiagency services of interest in this project. However, relatives and friends were also in frequent contact with the help-line, seeking advice, support and guidance on how they could approach or handle their young family member without causing more harm. During the time the help-line was operating, calls from relatives and friends were slowly but steadily increasing. It was often hard to know where to direct those who expressed concern for their loved ones becoming radicalized or their attraction to extremist milieus (Sivenbring 2018; 2019a). Furthermore, there was a lack of trust in the authorities, which their contact with a CSO helped to bridge. In 2018, the newly established Centre for Preventing Violent Extremism took over the telephone help-line service which now only handles calls from professional actors. According to the centre’s website, relatives and friends are encouraged to contact CSOs with their concerns 43.

In a press release from the Finnish Ministry of the Interior, Milla Perukangas, who leads a government project for improving referral of radicalized persons to relevant services says that: “Clients often find it easier to trust NGOs and communities than authorities. Local communities can help to reach out to those in a vulnerable position and guide them to the right services” (ibid. p.2) 44. There are also some studies showing that relatives and friends of individuals who are at risk of being drawn into an extremist movement, or who are already engaged in such a movement, avoid contact with government agencies

43 cve. se (2018-12-20) Kontaktvägar för stöd mot våldsbejakande extremism [contacts for support in countering violent extremism] [available 2019-02-06 at https://cve.se/stod.html ]
because they fear that their relatives could be reported to the authorities. It can be emotionally difficult to discuss these issues with friends or co-workers, and parents often feel that they are viewed as complicit and run the risk of being ostracized due to the actions or attitudes of their loved ones. To have a friend, a family member or a loved one involved in extremism can cause worry, shame and grief. (Brittain 2009; Guru 2012; Simi, Sporer & Bubolz 2016; Vanhanen & Heikkilä 2017; Aasgard 2018). A CSO can be an option for seeking guidance and support, as they can offer professional secrecy that government agencies, due to legal frameworks and obligations, cannot.

In Norway, the CVE policies are almost exclusively handled by the public agencies and CSOs mainly play a role in general prevention (Lid & Heirestad, 2019). Only in exceptional cases will CSOs intervene actively on high-risk individuals (ibid.). This is partly due to a large public sector and comes with its advantages and disadvantages. For instance, when handling individuals who are by and large sceptical towards the public apparatus and surveillance, this strategy might fall short in CVE work.

In Sweden, civil society and its organizations are also a source of expertise and services when it comes to supporting individuals who are in the process of defecting from an extremist movement. “Fryshuset” runs programs called Passus⁴⁵ (for defectors from criminal groups) and especially Exit⁴⁶ (for individuals who need support in defecting from extremist milieus). These initiatives have made an impact on similar programs in Denmark and Norway (Bjørgo, 2009). In Sweden, the “Knowledge centres” (Kunkapshusen) are expected to cooperate with civil society organizations in their work with defectors and their relatives. Also, the Centre for prevention of violent extremism advocates contacts with CSOs for individuals in need of exit support and guidance⁴⁷.

The civil society is also ascribed a special position for handling situations in vulnerable or exposed neighbourhoods. Referring to

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⁴⁵ Om Passus, available 2019-10-01 at: https://fryshuset.se/verksamhet/passus/2540
⁴⁶ Om Exit, [available 2019-10-02 at: https://fryshuset.se/verksamhet/exit/om-exit
research, SOU 2017:110 stated that civil society organizations are
important in these areas as trust in government agencies is often low.
Civil society can then offer an alternative, constituting a meaningful
platform for building trust, confidence and feelings of belonging.

Hence, CSOs are regarded as a trustworthy actor able to interact
naturally with the local community. Activities run by CSOs can provide
non-violent alternatives for young individuals, and offer additional help
and support, in this case provide and offer are keywords that pinpoint the
voluntary character of these organizations. Their position in the local
community make them suitable to serve as a connection between
government agencies and citizens while also having a monitoring
function: “The actor that is first to highlight new problems” (Official

In short, the role of civil society and its organizations is:

- To offer a sense of belonging and positive alternatives to
  harmful milieus.
- To build resilience against anti-democratic practices among
  citizens.
- To compensate for services that might be lacking or
  insufficient for people in need.
- To serve as a trustworthy and sometimes more confidential
  alternative for people with little trust in public organizations.
- To offer support and guidance and channel individuals to
  appropriate services.

3.6 Conclusion

As illustrated by the surveys in this part of the report, there are both
similarities and differences in how the Nordic countries’ approaches
are framed and organized to handle the problem of violent extremism
and radicalization. To conclude Section 3 and the mapping of
organizational structures, we summarize some of the similarities and
differences between Nordic multiagency organizations.
Action, Agency and Actors

- **Three-tier organizational structures:** The multiagency approaches in all the Nordic countries seem to follow a three-tier organizational structure where governance, coordination and operational units are aligned. This structure is a chain of command, connecting the political level with the executive and operational local levels. It is also meant to enable a local situational overview and flexibility in adapting interventions to local needs and to the available local resources. This might be of importance when working with individuals at risk and in need of support.

- **Initiating and establishing multiagency efforts:** There are some differences in how this cooperation is initiated and established between the agencies. In Finland, it is intended to be (to some extent) mandatory, and implemented by and through the police. This is similar to Denmark, where the district police chief is required to establish councils consisting of the police chief and the mayors of the municipalities. In these, trends in crime and questions of crime prevention are to be discussed. Multiagency work through SSP cooperation has been established for a long time and its placement in police districts makes it available when the need arises. In Sweden, multiagency work is often preceded by an agreement between the municipality and the local police force, but it is unclear who is to initiate it. SSP[f] work in Sweden is not widespread and to date no regulations or recommendations for the model exist. In Norway, establishment is reliant on local needs and resources and SLT collaboration is initiated by an agreement of cooperation between municipalities and police. SLT has been implemented in around 50 per cent of Norwegian municipalities.

- **Agencies in charge:** The police is the governing agency for multiagency efforts in Denmark and Finland while this work in Sweden and Norway is governed by the municipalities in
cooperation with the police (more so in Norway, less so in Sweden). In Sweden, social services in the municipalities are in charge of these multiagency efforts. Although there are differences, the crime prevention discourse is very evident in Nordic policy documents. The police are in the position of being the agency in charge and acknowledged as the expert source of knowledge. Since violent extremism (in cases where violence is used) is a criminal offence, this comes as no surprise.

- **Using existing structures or establishing new ones:** Denmark, Norway and Sweden have all previously established multiagency cooperation for handling problems with delinquent children and young people. These collaborations are now being utilized to include interventions in the area of extremism and radicalization prevention. To make this cooperation more effective, it is complemented by additional expertise (such as Kunskapshus, Info houses, Radicalization contacts). Finland have been inspired by the multiagency collaborations that have been successful in Norway and Denmark in particular, and has established a structure for handling the somewhat novel problem of extremism and radicalization. Sweden has chosen a somewhat more ambivalent and non-permanent solution.

- **Incorporated agencies:** The operational units that put into practice the actions and measures decided consist of actors representing different agencies and disciplinary expertise. The primary agencies involved in the Nordic multiagency approaches for handling violent extremism are the police, social services, and schools and educational services. In Sweden and Norway, youth workers, after-school centre supervisors and teachers are also involved. In Finland, psychiatric nurses are permanent partners in the Anchor teams while school staff or youth workers are not mentioned to the same extent.

- **Additional expertise:** In order to provide the multiagency approaches with expertise in handling issues specifically related to radicalization and violent extremism, the operational SSP/SLT and Anchor units are supported by municipal or
regional units such as Kunskapshusen or local CVE coordinators (in Sweden), Info houses (in Denmark) and by police local council, SLT-coordinators and radicalization contacts (in Norway). In Finland, there is a network in the capital region which ensures that the work is done according to the guidelines. These supportive hubs are specialized in handling and managing issues of radicalization and violent extremism. These expert units are connected to the multiagency teams by coordinators or contacts who are often situated within the police force.

- **Coordinators:** One of the most important functions mentioned in policies and evaluations is the coordinating, consulting or contact function. These often function as a link between different organizational levels and as bearers of relevant information. The coordinating function can also make sure that relevant expertise is in place and that local needs are met.

- **Incorporating civil society:** In all the Nordic countries, civil society and its organizations are explicitly mentioned in policy as part of their preventive efforts. In some cities, they are fully integrated in the work while in others they are integrated to a lesser extent. The incorporation of these (often) social actors utilises a “whole society approach”, as civil society organizations are believed to have more legitimacy when reaching out to citizens and especially to young citizens. Their privileged position as voluntary and free from obligations and sometimes even membership or registration can make them appear to be safer for certain individuals. CSOs are often able to build trustworthy relationships with individuals in need of support.

**Scene and Purpose**

- **Local understanding:** The need for multiagency approaches as a way of dealing with problems with young individuals is mainly dependent on local resources, the local situation and needs. There are many cities and municipalities in the Nordic
countries that have never, and likely never will, encounter problems connected to extremism. Therefore, the need for collaboration in general in most cases is not focused on violent extremism, but on handling cases where individuals at risk can get support and guidance.

- **Protected value:** The main objective of multiagency cooperation in the Nordic countries is to prevent crime, protect fundamental rights, prevent people from choosing violence and reducing the threat of violent extremism to society. Thus, they are meant to prevent, protect and reduce the impact of violence that in some cases may be connected to extremism.
4. Recommended Practices and Advocating Multiagency Approaches

Q: What are the recommended practices in national policy documents regarding a multiagency approach to CVE, and how are these practices advocated?

There is little evidence of practices that are proven to be effective when it comes to successfully preventing or countering violent extremism and radicalization (Eriksson, Beckman, Sager 2018; Feddes & Galucci 2015; DK Center for Forebyggelse af Ekstremisme 2018). Successful practices take a long time to develop and adapt, and consequently, their effectiveness in preventing violence and extremism is difficult to evaluate and validate. This is also commented on by the Danish DKR (2012), as they are experiencing an increased demand for crime prevention based on scientific evidence and knowledge about functional methods that have been proven to work effectively. One conclusion DKR draws from this focus on evidence and efficacy is that it is caused by a need for control over public (economic) resources.

There is some academic literature that looks at different perspectives on multiagency approaches for handling problematic issues, and how these approaches are motivated or advocated. For instance, Burnett and Appleton (2004) studied multiagency approaches for handling youth criminality in England and Wales. They highlighted how speedy access to information, advice and specialist attention are portrayed as bonuses for young people in need. These aspects often appear to be
the centre of attention when advocating multiagency work. Another aspect that is mentioned less often is that multiagency approaches can be seen as an answer to “the growing amount of clients with multiple problems that require the professionals to work across traditional professional boundaries” (Pohjola & Korhonen, 2014, p. 527). Complex problems demand complex solutions and the responsibilities that used to be handled by separate professional instances are being transferred into multiagency organizational forms.

This section is dedicated to explorations of 1) the recommended practices and 2) how multiagency approaches are advocated. In this section, the parts of the national policy documents and frameworks that deal with cooperation between agencies have been collected and analysed. We also incorporate local policy, handbooks and evaluations related to the field and to some extent “grey literature” in the analysis.

### 4.1 Recommended Practices

Recommended practices for a multiagency approach to CVE are scarce in the national policies. This might be because the specific objective to counter extremism is a rather new one and that these multiagency approaches are not only concerned with issues of radicalization and violent extremism. They often rely on collaborations where roles might be allocated on the basis of the actors’ original professional expertise or tasks. There is also an inherent logic in not being very specific in defining recommended practices, since one of the strengths pointed out in multiagency organization is that practice can be adapted according to local and situational needs.

However, one of the objectives mentioned in the Norwegian police strategy for crime prevention is to identify and collect examples of best practices (National Police Directorate, 2018 p. 10). We could regard this as a case of there being a lot of good practices and methods being used by different agencies and by local units and that these could be collected, but as we as far as we are aware, these have not been properly tested and validated. Also, multiagency work can be regarded as one of the methods or initiatives believed to be “best practice”. As acknowledged by the Danish Centre for Prevention of Extremism
(National Center for Forebyggelse af Ekstremisme, 2018), the research and literature on prevention seems to focus on results that could strengthen preventive actions, or results that rely on subjective experiences of these actions. Thus, there might be different definitions of what constitutes “best practice”. The Danish DKR (2012) mentions that efficiency and evidence is often firmly tied to economy, meaning that best practice is sometimes equated with economically efficient practices.

In this section, we focus on recommended practices that come in different forms and from different senders, which make them hard to compare. Some of them are more conceptual, while others are formulated as handbooks containing concrete advice that might not be exclusively designed for multiagency work. In addition, the task of countering or preventing extremism is placed within an organization that is already hybrid, where the new task might add further hybridity.

We describe some of the ways in which recommended practices are formulated in different policy documents at the government agency or local level in the four Nordic countries separately. As concluded in the previous section, the field is influenced and controlled by the police and by crime prevention discourses. This is evident from the search for policies focusing on practice in multiagency approaches leading us to documented policy and recommended practice which is primarily supplied by the police. In order to make the section somewhat systematic, we therefore focus on the publications from police crime prevention services as key documents, and add recommended practices from other agencies where these exist.

We differentiate between two aspects of the recommended practices namely the *whys and the hows*, or in pentad analytical terms the purpose, the act and the agency of the practices and start from the following queries:

1) What are described as elements of success? What recommendations are made for making the approach work?
2) What are the tools, methods or techniques mentioned in policy for concrete operational work with “at-risk individuals”?

**Denmark - elements of success**

The *Danish National Council for Crime Prevention* provides a guide for successful SSP cooperation (DKR, 2012). Trust between actors is essential for both prevention and intervention, and something that needs to be in focus for operational work (ibid. p.10). The Crime Prevention Council highlights some important factors for successful SSP:

- There need to be clear definitions of responsibilities for each level
- It is important to ensure that knowledge is disseminated to all levels and relevant knowledge needs to be gathered, coordinated and mediated
- Concrete knowledge of local needs and realities is regarded as crucial and essential for effective cooperation. The organization of SSP need to reflect the concrete challenges and needs of the local community

- There needs to be mutual respect and receptiveness between agencies.

The local reality and knowledge of local circumstances and needs are put forward as one of the main foundations of functional SSP cooperation (DKR, 2012, p.17). Indeed, the Danish approach stresses the need for regularly updated knowledge and evaluations of the situation in order to tailor appropriate actions.

**Tools and techniques**

First and foremost, the DKR guide focuses on the collaborative aspects of SSP efforts and frameworks for how to utilize different expertise to make the best of prevention and interventions. The tools and techniques seem to be best developed by the actual operational units
in cooperation with the SSP coordinators. However, there are some recommendations in the guidelines for successful collaboration.

- Use all the information at hand, involve people who are related to the young individual.
- A more complete evaluation of the situation makes it easier to formulate concrete actions.
- Work with, discuss, develop and share good examples.

The Danish Ministry of Social Affairs and the Interior has published a series of handbooks for the prevention of extremism. The Handbook for relationships and mentoring addresses professionals within SSP (along with others working with young individuals at risk of radicalization). The handbook gives some advice on how to evaluate the situation, how to work with relationships, how to communicate and how to prepare and assign mentors to the person in need of assistance. In short, some of the recommended practices are:

- Focus on the individual’s resources and motivational factors to formulate concrete and attainable goals and evaluate them.
- Thoroughly prepare every meeting with the mentee, be attentive to the mentee’s needs.
- A relationship needs to be based on mutual trust, and on the individual and his/her experiences, not on his/her ideological beliefs. Keep the personal and the private separate.
- Never try to convince, press, preach, moralize or condemn.
- Assign a mentor who has something in common with, or who can easily understand, the young individual in need. They might have similar experiences, religion, interests, etc.

The Handbook also contains a set of checklists and plans that can be used in the practical work with young individuals. These mainly show factors to consider when communicating with a person in need of support, and some guidance in how to map risk and resilience factors,

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48 Forebyggelse af ekstremisme en håndbogsserie. Relations- og mentorarbejde.
resources and motivation. Thus, the checklists focus on the practical aspects rather than assessing if the individual is at risk.

The Danish approach appears to emphasise knowledge in general and specific knowledge about the individual in need of an intervention. Furthermore, it focuses on relational aspects and on collaboration between actors where the individual client is in centre of attention.

**Finland- elements of success**

The Finnish Ministry of the Interior (2014)\(^{49}\) is of the view that multi-professional collaboration can produce more and better services, for the same costs. We understand this as an expression of society getting more value for the money spent. In Finland’s policy, we find some elements that are believed to bring success to the Anchor approach. These are presented at a more conceptual level and describe the prerequisites of functional cooperation.

- The benefits of the cooperation are recognized when stakeholders trust each other. They need to have a positive attitude and motivation for the cooperation. Participants in the multi-professional group understand each other, where they are coming from, their circumstances, and are capable of seeking new ideas, points of view and solutions through conversation and collaboration. Essential for professional collaboration are good will, respect for others, responsibility for one’s own actions and willingness to help and listen to others in an appropriate way.

- Multi-professional collaboration requires shared aims. The purpose is to intervene in problems together.

- It is important to agree on the common rules and structures of the collaboration.

- The models are modified in relation to local needs and are continuously evaluated and developed.

\(^{49}\) References from this publication have been kindly translated from Finnish into English by our Finnish colleagues.
**Tools and techniques**

In 2019, the Ministry of the Interior published a handbook for Anchor collaborations (Moilanen, Airaksinen & Kangasniemi, 2019). The handbook suggests a number of concrete actions. In some sections it is very detailed:

- When a client has been selected, he or she is invited to a meeting where information about the concern and the motivation for a multi-professional course of action is introduced. A plan is formulated for upcoming meetings. Parents are, if it is advisable, invited to the initial meeting. The following meetings are reserved for the client alone.

- The meetings mainly take place at police facilities, but if required meetings can be arranged elsewhere.

- Informed consent must be obtained from the client to share information within the multiagency group.

- During meetings the client, parents or relatives and experts give their version of the incident (or the reason for the Anchor team’s involvement). It is important to listen to the client. The experts then inform the client about the legal position and the eventual consequences of the incident.

- Everyone needs to share their point of view. After this, the discussion can turn to details and the identification of needs for change, how this change can be achieved and how everyone involved can act to support the change.

Thus, the aim of the meetings is to find methods and support that promote the wellbeing of the client and to prevent him or her from committing crimes in the future. In order to achieve this, the handbook stresses the need to evaluate and map out the current life situation of the young individual. This is done by using a standardized template for discussion provided in the handbook. The use of the template is meant to ensure a multidimensional mapping of the situation.

The handbook also gives some detailed suggestions on setting up agendas for the meetings. Information letters, invitations or calls to attend meetings, to-do lists, templates for informed consent,
instructions for documenting activities, evaluation forms and a wordlist are included (ibid. p. 73-86).

The Finnish approach is (in policy) focused on reaching consensus between partners and actors. Through carefully planned meetings and conversations with the individual client, it is believed that he or she will make positive changes and refrain from committing crimes in the future.

Norway - elements of success

In Norway, crime prevention is posed as the primary strategy for the police and close collaboration with other actors is one of the central elements for the years to come (National Police Directorate, 2018).

The Norwegian Police’s (City of Oslo, 2014) SaLTo Handbook on concern, is focused on local practices and SLT efforts targeting young people aged 12-22. The handbook lists the different levels that are involved in preventive work followed by some guidelines for professionals who are concerned about someone at risk of becoming radicalized. This is then followed by a list of “potential signs of concern” (ibid, p.9) where statements, utterances, interests, aspects of appearance and use of symbols, activities, friends and social networks are themes that are mentioned. The next chapter presents potential risk and protective factors in the young person's immediate environment, and the last part of the handbook describes some examples of relevant actions (elements of success) that are coordinated through SLT, including:

- Cooperation between services and sectors, led by the police councils/SLT
- “A broad and constructive dialogue involving other government agencies, organizations and the local communities is essential to ensure success” (ibid. p.5)
- Development of individual action plans, activating measures and services for a specific individual.

In the handbook, dialogue is framed as a key method for preventing violent extremism: “Dialogue results in good relations, which in turn ensure good prevention” (ibid. p.11).
**Tools and techniques**

The methods or practices that are mentioned or recommended in the handbook (ibid. 2014) focus on dialogue and relational techniques such as conversation, mediation, mentoring, guidance and individual programmes.

- Conversation intervention is a much-used tool by the police in their contacts with young offenders.
- Mediation and reconciliation should follow conflicts and abuse, where schools and conflict councils are spaces for this.
- SLT uses mentors for young offenders and the mentor functions as a counsellor and influential sponsor/supporter.
- Guidance for parents and the parents’ network can be provided in the local community.

The police (National Police Directorate, 2018) promote the SLT model as an effective and relevant model for preventing crime. Besides close collaboration and involvement, the strategy requires increased priority and knowledge about models for cooperation, innovation, project work and trans-agency cooperation.

The Norwegian recommended practices appear to rest on conversational techniques and social psychology foundations and social relationships are their focus. Their protective value can be found in the individuals and their chances of positive change through mediation, counselling, reconciliation and mentoring. At the core is a need for building trust and resilience.

**Sweden - elements of success**

The Swedish Police (2017) describe some elements of success in multiagency cooperation and encourage local police to:

- Strive for broad cooperation, and try to incorporate partners from different agencies and organizations
- Cooperate with the local community on issues that involve the people living there
Integrate the issue of violent extremism into existing crime prevention efforts

Strive towards showing a positive result that proves that cooperation is useful and something to build upon (Swedish Police, 2017 p.8).

Thus, a key element of success is indeed cooperation, and another is to prove how effective cooperation is. The foundation of effective collaboration is sharing relevant information between actors. This information is divided into two types: 1) general situational awareness that describes and visualizes the problem; and 2) specific information that contains direct or indirect personal data. Of these two, the former is not associated with any ethical or legal restrictions, while the latter calls for careful consideration.

The importance of trust is also an aspect when it comes to collaborative work between the police and other actors.

The police base their actions on conflict-reducing principles (knowledge, facilitation, communication and differentiation) in dialogue with cooperation partners. (The Police, 2017 p.10).

This means that the Swedish police recommend the use of conflict reducing dialogue, not only when in contact with clients, but also when cooperating with others.

According to an evaluation of Sweden’s CVE efforts, coordination and clarity are useful when it comes to expanding cooperation between different actors involved (Statskontoret, 2018). In fact, one element of success is that there is a coordinating agent. Whether it is a person or a position, the coordinating function has increased cooperation by an estimated 70% between the years 2014 and 2017 (ibid.).

The coordinating function is also given some attention in the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ, 2016) manual: Samverkan, i lokalt brottsförebyggande arbete (Cooperation in local crime prevention efforts). It describes the agreements for cooperative work between police and municipal services such as schools and social services. According to the manual, an agreement should be based on local needs and problems that the police and municipality can solve.
together. The agreement should stipulate practical issues such as time frames, the establishment of a new organization for mutual governance and evaluation. The decision is about the clarification of participants’ roles, obligations, mandates and powers and for giving the collaborative work status and legitimacy (BRÅ, 2016 p.19). Other elements of success in collaboration are the identification of key actors and new potential partners, the clarification of the organization’s motives for collaboration, knowledge of each other’s organizations, and respecting rules regarding professional secrecy.

**Tools and techniques**

The practices recommended by the Swedish Police (2017) resemble those in the Norwegian policy. They are focused on relational work and on building trust:

- Create good relations and trust in the local community; this also increases the chances of detecting and preventing radicalization.
- Good relations take time to establish and therefore the local police need to have support from the management.
- It is important that the individuals involved in building trust have an interest in other cultures, religions and events in the surrounding world as these events can have local consequences.

The relational work serves several purposes and by building trust the chances of detecting individuals at risk are increased. Trust in the police may also improve the chances of individuals seeking help and support if needed. Much like the Norwegian policies, the Swedish approach seems to rely on dialogue and reconciliation. Relationships and trust lie at the core of the policy and cooperation between different actors is framed as a way of achieving success.

**4.2 Schools and Social Services**

Individuals who are attracted to extremist milieus are generally rather young, and it is often advanced that there are strong incentives for
including preventive efforts in institutions that routinely deal with children and young people.

**Schools and preschools**

A prevailing theme is that educational and childcare services first and foremost have the task of safeguarding, preserving and developing democracy and democratic practices. This task is also in line with the foundational values that are formulated in the national curriculums of the Nordic countries (Sivenbring 2019b). Schools are one of the most important places for democratic social education. They can act as an arena or a safe space for dialogue and conversation, where social problems can also be resolved (O’Donnell 2016; Thomas, 2016; Mattsson 2019). Teachers and school staff are sometimes faced with contradictory tasks: “On the one hand, they are supposed to build trust, strengthen and reinforce democracy and ensure that students gain knowledge of, and practise human rights and democratic citizenship. On the other hand, they are supposed to use their classrooms as observatories to detect future radicals and criminals, and sometimes report a crime that has not yet been committed” (Sivenbring, 2019, p.8). The following section shows some of the recommendations and objectives for schools and educational services. It is presented as recurring themes in policy at various levels.

**The safeguarding of democracy**

As an important institution in societal development, educational institutions have a responsibility in safeguarding democracy. Teachers, youth workers and school staff often have close relations with young people and access to important information about their everyday lives.

The Danish national action plan (DK, 2016) places preschools and schools in the general prevention level. Their main task is to train students in critical thinking and democratic citizenship, to build resilience and prevent risky behaviour. The plan also reveals that there are a lot of ongoing programmes under development and these are focused on developing tools and methods for handling extremism. The mission for schools and educational services is also to alert social services and the security services when students show signs of
becoming radicalized in the same way as they do when criminal behaviour is detected.

The Finnish National Agency for Education (2018) states that schools can do much to promote wellbeing and prevent marginalization. Good self-esteem, a sense of belonging and the experience of genuine opportunities to participate can protect against marginalization (Elo et al. 2017). Also, the Finnish national action plan (FI, 2016) is focused on democratic citizenship and how to use parliamentary ways of effecting change. Critical thinking and knowledge about religion and culture are mentioned. Among the preventive measures (ibid.2016), the educational ministries are responsible for two out of 36 measures. Both of these are aimed at enhancing critical skills and building resilience against online propaganda.

In the Norwegian Actionplan (2014), schools are listed as actors that need to “improve their capability of detecting and acting in the event of any concerns that may arise” (ibid. p.18). The Ministry of Justice and Public Security is responsible for affording guidelines on how to identifying and dealing with early signs of radicalization and for developing tools for meeting the challenges. There are also some recommended material that can be used in schools, for example the European Council’s publication “No Hate-Speech” which has been translated into Norwegian.

The Swedish National Agency for Education (2018) says that educational institutions have no explicit responsibility to prevent crime. However, school principals have the responsibility to ensure that the school environment is safe and secure by preventing violence and all other forms of offensive behaviour for example. It is also firmly stated that schools are to focus primarily on their democratic task. One initiative established in SOU 2017:110 was to develop a resource for teachers to work with controversial issues.

**Identifying individuals at risk of radicalization**

There are no legal requirements that teachers and school staff in the Nordic countries should report students that show signs of being at risk of radicalization, as it is in the UK where the PREVENT duty
obliges teachers to detect and report at risk signs and behaviour. However, the identification of individuals at risk of becoming radicalized is one of the more self-evident tasks given to schools and teaching staff. The main rational behind this task is not report these individuals to other actors but rather to provide opportunities for school personnel to intervene. Thus, schools may anyway be given the responsibility to observe, investigate and report individuals who show signs of concern (NO, 2014; Nasjonal veileder for forebygging av radikalisering og voldelig ekstremisme, 2016).

In Finland, the detection of young individuals at risk of radicalization is mentioned as a duty for the education sector and youth services (and social services). Teachers are presented as key actors in preventing violent extremism; however, they “might not always distinguish how the behaviour or various problems may be associated with and make them vulnerable to radicalisation” (FI, 2016 p.17). Youth workers can identify young people who are drawn to extremism and changes in their behaviours. In cases of concern, school and social welfare services collaborate in assessing the situation and if needed contact the police. It is the responsibility of the police to make sure that adolescents are steered towards the appropriate services (Elo et al. 2017, Finnish National Agency for Education, 2018). Recommended practices for teachers in school and preschools are scarce when it comes to handbooks, strategies and action plans. However, the national action plan against violent radicalization (FI, 2016), advises school staff to cooperate with other agencies. Teachers and educational staff can also be considered to be participants in Anchor team efforts.

As acknowledged by Elo et al. (2017) and by the Finnish National Agency for Education (2018), the task of preventing violent radicalization in Finnish schools is a rather new one. Thus, it may be difficult to discuss these issues in schools and there is also a lack of reliable knowledge and evidence of practices that could be regarded as best practices for tackling this area. Teachers and school principals may feel uncertain about how to confront students’ expressions of extremist views and if and when they ought to contact the police or other agencies. According to Elo et al. (2017) and the Finnish National Agency for Education (2018), it is important that students feels secure and accepted at school and that they can express their thoughts without
fear. Communication should be open and non-judgmental, working with the adolescent is essential where there is cause for concern, and they should be involved with their local community. Every adolescent should feel that they are part of a community and that they are seen and heard.

In the Norwegian national action plan against radicalization (No, 2014) there are no specific measures or actions for schools or educational services. However, schools and educational services are listed among important actors for measures. The plan is, as mentioned before, dynamic and generic. However, there is a guide for how first-line personnel (teachers, social services agents, youth workers, police, etc.) should act if they came into contact with someone who might be at risk of radicalization (Håndtering ved bekymring in NO, 2014 p.27). The guide recommends to:

- Engage in dialogue with the young person. The one who suspects radicalization engages in a dialogue, aimed at identifying signs of concern and risk. Any concerns and suspicions can be discussed with others.
- Discuss concerns. If the young person is in school, discuss the concerns with the school principal or school administration, and with other teaching resources. Make decisions about who is responsible for investigate the concerns.
- Report concerns. The school or school administration can consult child protection services or the police who can decide if a formal report of concern is necessary.
- The guide is supplemented with a list of at-risk signs (ibid, p.29).

Given that schools are inclined put emphasis on education and fostering democratic citizenship, and preferably not on identifying individuals at risk, the task for teachers and school personnel in the multiagency teams may be unclear. Their privileged position as being close to young individuals in their everyday lives can be utilised in relational efforts. According to the Danish DKR (2012), teachers and school personnel can contribute to SSP efforts by providing involved students with a specialised syllabus or study plan.
Cooperating with others

The Swedish National Agency for Education (2018) has stated that cooperation with social services and the police is essential in combating violent extremism. Also, an official commission of inquiry report (SOU 2017:110) highlighted the need for cooperation. Based on the importance of efforts to prevent violent extremism being conducted in the local community, how schools act, how responsive social services are, how civil society works, how good relations are between the local police and involved municipal actors are all crucial factor for successful CVE efforts (ibid. 2017:110, p.226). However, the official commission of inquiry (SOU 2018:65) showed that there are uncertainties about who does what, and also an exaggerated reliance on other agencies knowing what should be done. The schools committee in the City of Stockholm (2018) noted a need to utilise and develop methods for collaboration between schools, social services and the police in particular. In order to clarify routines for joint actions in preventing radicalization, a flow chart has been developed. It is intended to show how city employees should act when they encounter incidents that cause concern about radicalization (in the actual publication, the flow chart is missing).

In Norway, schools are encouraged to cooperate with the police and child protection services. The national action plan (NO, 2014) especially recommends that schools investigate and report before contacting other government agencies. The City of Oslo (2014) recommends that where there is concern about radicalization, school personnel contact and cooperate with radicalization contacts and local police to get support and guidance.

Social services

Social services are traditionally involved when people are in need of support and guidance. Furthermore, social services often have an understanding of the local situation and contacts at the public support services and services offered by civil society.

In Denmark, a new amendment have been added to the Social Services Act, making it easier for municipals authorities to intervene when
individuals over 18 are at risk of becoming radicalized or want to disengage from violent extremist groups. Apart from this, social services are hardly mentioned elsewhere in the national action plan (DK, 2016) other than as partners in multiagency work. In fact, social services are mentioned a lot less than civil society organizations and associations.

The Finnish national action plan (FI, 2016) lists different actors and their tasks in preventing radicalization and violent extremism. The list recognizes social services as being an important function when it comes to assessing people's needs for special support and to guide them to appropriate services “such as benefits for unemployment, education and livelihood” (p.17). As social services are also responsible for child protection, their mission is aimed in particular at supporting and helping individuals under 18. However, among the measures and objectives that identify agencies in charge or responsible for different tasks, social services and the healthcare system are not mentioned (e.g. the police is responsible for 11/36; the Ministry of the Interior for 6/36 and the Ministries of Justice/Integration/Foreign Affairs are responsible for 4).

In Norway, social workers’ main priority is the client’s social issues (Haugstvedt, 2017). Strategies often involve face-to-face meeting as a way of gaining trust, with the interest in learning about the client and their needs. The social services in Norway are incorporated into an organizational hybrid: Ny Arbeids- og Velferdsforvaltning (NAV). The social services are still formally belonging to the municipalities, but their work is mostly coordinated with state bureaucracy and decoupled from municipal preventive services. The local social services are seldom in contact with individuals at risk of radicalization, if these are not initiating contact by themselves. In some municipalities, NAV can be responsible for helping and following up specific radicalized individuals, helping them to find a job, a place to live and other practical issues. This kind of intervention is often called “Entry” (in reference to, but rather than, Exit). In the Actionplan (NO, 2014), child welfare services are defined as actors that schools can contact to

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50 New work- and welfare agency.
51 Personal communication, Tore Bjørgo 2019-09-17
discuss concern anonymously, and also if necessary, report the concern.

In Sweden, social services appear to have been given a more central role than in the other Nordic countries. The National Board of Health and Welfare (2016) gives some recommendations for multiagency cooperation, in this case related to SIG (social action groups) which are not specifically focused on CVE but on prevention and interventions when young individuals show signs of being at risk. Thus, the establishment of SIG groups is reliant on local needs and the numbers of young individuals in need of support. Furthermore, the composition of the group is dependent on the individual needs. For successful work, the cooperation needs to be based on a common foundation and:

- An understanding of different professional tasks and limitations and reasonable expectations of what can be achieved.
- A consensus about the target group and the aims of the cooperation.
- Clear routines for steps in the work and for evaluating actions.

According to support material from the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen, 2018), social workers are mainly in contact with individuals as they are about to enter or exit an extremist milieu; otherwise they are more likely to be in contact with relatives. The task of social services is to offer support and to prevent individuals from getting involved in destructive milieus. This means that individual needs are assessed in relation to the individual’s social environment, including immediate family, relations, work, housing and integration in society (Socialstyrelsen 2018, p.18). The National Board of Health and Welfare emphasizes the importance of collaborating with other agencies. This is based on the Administrative Procedure Act (SFS 1986:223) that obliges the agency to do so. The Board also stresses the need to be clear about the differences in responsibilities for cooperating agencies. In giving some directions and guidelines for
cooperation, they refer to SKL (2010) “elements of success” and the following recommendations:\textsuperscript{52}

- Always cooperate, not only when it’s necessary.
- Be up to date on the local situation.
- Utilise actors’ engagement, skills and strengths.
- Build on existing activities.
- Work on several fronts - promotive, preventive and countering.
- Make the individual, not their ideology, the centre of attention.
- Allocate roles for everyone involved; communicate.
- Adapt action plans to each individual.

The recommendations especially stress the need for cooperation for being up to date on the local situation, and are about not being focused on individuals but rather on the phenomena, trends, attitudes and opinions that are circulating in the local community.

In Finland, social services “can identify a variety of warning signals associated with radicalisation and refer people to the required services” (FI, 2016 p.17). Unlike the other Nordic countries the Finnish Anchor team services explicitly include healthcare professionals, and most often these are related to psychiatry. Healthcare services are mainly described as a coordinating, facilitating hub. They can access public and third sector (CSO) services for disengagement from violence. The national action plan (FI, 2016) discusses how, even though violent radicalization and extremism is not a mental illness, some research indicates correlations between extremism and mental health problems: “This being the case, mental health services play an important role in preventing violent radicalisation and extremism” (FI, 2016, p.17)

\textsuperscript{52} (SKL, 2010, p 37–40; National Board of Health and Welfare 2018, p. 26)
4.3 Advocating a Multiagency Approach

In the following section, we have identified how collaborative approaches are advocated, motivated or argued for in the national and local policy documents. We have identified three different types of arguments for using multiagency approaches in handling violent extremism (and other forms of delinquent or at-risk-behaviours) in the Nordic national policy documents:

- To use existing structures and organizations for extended purposes.
- To gather and share knowledge and expertise.
- To coordinate actions for a more effective response.

To use existing structures and organizations

Collaborative approaches for preventing violent extremism rest on already established organizational structures anchored in crime prevention efforts. In the Nordic case, SSP, SLT, Anchor team and SSP(f) approaches are very much inspired by one another. The use of existing arenas for cooperation is highlighted by the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security (2016) as convenient, since it allows the utilization of established routines for issues such as reporting and following up on individuals who cause concern or who are regarded as being “at risk” (of radicalization). The same logics are used in Denmark, where the SSP structure and multiagency cooperation have a long history of being used in preventing young individuals from doing or coming to harm (DKR, 2012).

The SSP/SLT/SSP(f) and Anchor team services were not initially established for countering or preventing radicalization and violent extremism, but by using additional expertise they have been facilitated for those purposes. In Norway the Police Council is one of the SLT’s collaborating partners. In an evaluation of the collaboration between the two units, the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security (NO, 2014) stated that the Police Council may benefit from
collaborating with SLT teams since this form of cooperation is so well established within its organizational structure. This is also the case for the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen, 2018) which advocate cooperation in everyday practice to make cooperation easier when more “wicked problems” occur: “In other words, cooperation can be facilitated by using existing structures, for example general crime prevention work” (Ibid. p.26).

The Finnish Ministry of the Interior (2014) stated that multi-professional collaboration can be cost-saving. One motivation for multi-professional collaboration is that problems can be solved comprehensively and tackled in a purposeful way. With scarce resources, authorities need to prioritize their usage. Early intervention saves resources, as functional models produce benefits for all participants.

To gather and share knowledge and expertise

A common idea is that greater knowledge, insight and understanding can more or less cultivate societies that are against violence. Cooperation between agencies is meant to bring together both knowledge and expertise about extremism and radicalization. The idea of collaboration between agencies is founded on discourses of expert knowledge where knowledge about and “know how” concerning radicalization and violent extremism is an advantage for the actors in possession of it.

Multiagency cooperation is primarily about integrating the various knowledge and decision-making capabilities that the involved partners individually represent for a common good (DKR, 2012 p. 18)\(^{53}\).

In the Danish SSP context, there is also an express need for the further development of knowledge among professional actors and for municipalities to acquire qualified knowledge and skills to be utilized at the operational level.

\(^{53}\) Original in Danish: Det tværfaglige samarbejde handler først og fremst om at integrere de forskellige videns- og beslutningskompetencer, som de involverede samarbejdspartnere hver for sig repræsenterer, i et fælles bedste.
Gathering expertise and knowledge in specific forums such as the *Info houses* or Knowledge Centres enables easy access for practitioners or public actors in need of guidance. Professional experts representing different disciplines and areas are equipped with different instruments, techniques and tools for handling problems and challenges. Through collaboration, the different agencies gain access to an even wider range of instruments.

The Finnish Ministry of the Interior (2014) argues that there are few security related issues that can be resolved by a single authority. Solving problems requires wider perspectives. Multi-professional collaboration helps to see each authority’s work as part of a bigger picture where everyone is aware of their own tasks, and at the same time they are committed to common goals and aims.

The multiagency approach is supposed to facilitate both the dissemination and sharing of knowledge as well as providing training to local authorities. In this sense, practitioners working within multiagency teams are experts within the field and as such they function as resources for other participants in prevention efforts and employees working in close contact with members of the public (DK, 2016). In Finland, the annual assessment of the national action plan (Ministry of the Interior, 2017) states that cooperation between agencies “promotes the development of skills and the dissemination of best practices” (ibid. p.17). However, there are no specifications of what these “best practices” might be. It also seems that the police are often assigned the tasks of training and disseminating knowledge and best practices to other agencies.

In Norway, the SLT coordinators are given the specific task of providing knowledge and information to the steering committee, and to allocating different disciplinary expertise in operational groups. Information, expert knowledge and overview are some of the key components in the cooperation and as it is formulated in Norwegian policy: “The ones who do not know where the problem really lies, can’t do anything about the problem”54 (KRÅD, 2011 p. 25). Multiagency

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operational units are also advocated as facilitators or providers of “necessary training to regional authorities and other actors”, making sure that these are informed of who to contact when intervention is needed (FI 2016).

Knowledge and expertise are also related to what function collaborative hubs can have regarding the intelligence services, and information about certain individuals or milieus, that can be provided by and within multiagency networks. This kind of information or knowledge can be used for the identification of individuals who might constitute a risk to society, or for handling individual cases. As stated in the Danish action plan (2016), “the info houses are partly intended as knowledge sharing forums where challenges and methods in relation to the prevention of radicalization can be discussed, and partly function as a framework for the collaboration between the police and the municipalities in reviewing and managing actual cases”.

The need or the desire to identify individuals at risk of becoming radicalized is evident among the objectives, measures and actions in Nordic CVE. In the Finnish action plan, one of the prioritized measures is to “Increase skills, expertise and awareness as regards the prevention of violent radicalization and extremism” (FI, 2016 measure 4.5). To accomplish this, the following objective has been formulated:

Professionals and the representatives of organisations who, in their everyday work, encounter people who have, or are about to, become radicalised are able to widely recognise the underlying signs of radicalisation and properly act in order to put an end to the development that leads to radicalisation. Developing capabilities and professional skills is supported by information obtained from research. (FI, 2016 p.23).

A well-functioning multiagency approach where knowledge and expertise are shared can have synergistic effects. Not only does it strengthen one’s own agency or professional identity, the effect of a hybrid organization might also strengthen and multiply the expertise and preparedness of the multiagency professional unit as such. The Danish DKR (2012) states that this is dependent on secure professional identities and a clear understanding of differences in ways of acting within difference professions, and who is responsible for what. In line with this notion, the multiagency approach that accepts
and acknowledges differences and appreciates the plethora of solutions that may be available also promotes a more positive work environment.

**To coordinate cooperation for a more effective response**

Cooperation between agencies and actors is generally described as a more effective way of organizing preventive and interventive actions and as an organizational set-up that allows for bypassing boundaries between agencies.

The operation of local cooperation groups has facilitated collaboration between the authorities and with organizations, and lowered the threshold for acting together across sectoral boundaries, where necessary (FI, Ministry of the interior, 2017, p. 17).

The Norwegian Police’s strategy for crime prevention stresses the need for expanding SLT cooperation between Norwegian municipalities. Mobilisation, involvement and mutual cooperation are framed as key elements (National Police Directorate, 2018 p. 13).

They are also defined as more effective in their division of responsibilities and various resources that can be utilized when needed. The efficiency is also connected to competences, expertise and knowledge that can be allocated within the cooperation unit:

*Cooperation - we cooperate closely with other actors, share knowledge and have access to skills and tools that can be flexibly and efficiently utilized to get results. (NO, National Police Directorate, 2018 p. 5)*

Needless to say, coordination and effective responses to common problems are also economically advantageous. This is also an important incentive for multiagency approaches. For instance, in Finland, the Ministry of the Interior (2013) explicitly states that early intervention and support is more economical for society than helping adolescents when the situation has already escalated and marginalization has increased.

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55 Norwegian original. "Samarbeid- Vi samarbeider tett på tvers og med andre aktører, deler kunnskap og har tilgjengelig kompetanse og virkemidler som benyttes fleksibelt og effektivt for å skape resultater."
Collaboration between authorities is highlighted especially on issues where children and adolescents are involved. As the approach integrates specific professional expertise, actions can rapidly be implemented and activated for young people in need of support (Ministry of the Interior 2013.)

4.4 Conclusions

Recommended Practices

The recommended practices seem to focus on the following elements: Relationships; Mutual Trust; Responsibility, Accountability, Clarity, Coordination, and Local Understanding. They constitute the core of achieving success in multiagency approaches.

The importance of mutual trust and relationships

Mutual trust relates to trust between the agencies involved in the cooperation, but also within the agencies and in relation to the individuals that are the focus of an intervention. Trust includes building relationships between agencies and with citizens in the local community through dialogue. Trust in the internal work of the multiagency units is also about respect for and sensitivity to different perspectives and expertise that can be beneficial for handling the problems at hand. Trust can also be an incentive for bypassing obstacles to exchanging information. By building trust, consent from the individual in need can be gained, and also trust between professionals can informally bypass legal boundaries.

The importance of well-defined roles and responsibilities

Responsibility, accountability and clarity refer to the definition and allocation of roles. In an organization where responsibility and accountability are clearly defined between the involved actors, cooperation is most likely more effective. This also includes the importance of the involved actors being properly informed and involved in the work, and calls for the dissemination and exchange of knowledge and expertise. Clarity and well-defined frameworks and
communication for and about the cooperation can decrease potential internal conflicts (Pache & Santos 2013). This has been shown in the various checklists that are believed to help streamline the work, for example.

**The importance of local understanding and individualization**

Local understanding is crucial for successful practices. This includes a local overview of potential problems, prevailing attitudes and constellations as well as knowledge and contact with local resources who can be utilized. With local understanding and coordination, social networks are easier to activate. Among the successful elements, there is also a focus on individual adaptation and the need for individual action plans for persons in need of support and intervention. Much of the operational or intervention work being done in differing multiagency approaches is reliant on coordinating resources suitable for the specific profile of the individual. One such resource might be a mentor.

**Advocating a multiagency approach**

Advocations for multiagency approaches are mainly focused on the importance of facilitating knowledge from different fields of expertise. In summary advocations are revolving the following aspects:

- **Using established organizational structures** for handling problems can be an effective way to get access to an array of expertise. These are “off the shelf” solutions for a novel problem. This may be of great importance, since they facilitate opportunities to respond quickly, interventions can be early and these can be crucial for a successful outcome in the long run. Utilizing this expertise can also be economically advantageous.

- **The importance of knowledge** and expertise is the most prevalent motivation for using multiagency approaches for handling radicalization and violent extremism. Bringing together different areas of expertise can have synergistic effects and “best practises” can be developed. Knowledge and expertise are framed as an insulating force, protecting both citizens and society from extremist violence. One aspect that is often
mentioned in the documents is the need for more knowledge and the development of new ideas and methods.

- Knowledge can be utilized in a number of ways. It is an asset for the units in themselves, as knowledge about a problem is a prerequisite for handling it. Also, knowledge is something that can be shared, both with colleagues and with others who may come in contact with individuals at risk. Thus, knowledge of how one can detect and identify such individuals is framed as something that needs to be shared. Because of this, local knowledge can be an asset for national intelligence services.

- The police as experts, which can be utilized for educating others.

- Cooperation can bypass boundaries between agencies, or rather it can lower the thresholds for joint actions and streamline the organization for more rapid responses.
5. Legal Frameworks for Sharing Information

Q: What are the possibilities and obstacles for sharing information posed by the legal frameworks and professional secrecy rules within and between agencies (police, schools and social services) in the four Nordic countries?

Exchanging information between government agencies about individuals and groups who are perceived as vulnerable to radicalization or already radicalized is widely accepted as a central and important practice in both Nordic and global CVE efforts (e.g. RAN, 2016). The key rationale behind information sharing practices is that signs of radicalization can be detected in various organizational arenas, encouraging the sharing of such information between stakeholders such as the police, schools and social services.

In the Nordic countries, information sharing practices are often described as being organized in pre-existing collaboration structures, usually those activated in crime prevention targeting young people (see sections 3 & 4). In these structures, concerns are often handled by multiagency collaboration groups and as previously addressed in this report these often, but not exclusively, consist of the school, social services and the police. But as shown in previous research and this report, alternative and CVE-specific information sharing structures have been established (Andersson Malmros & Mattsson, 2017; Ramboll, 2018). Hence, the question is not whether information sharing as a practice is relevant for CVE efforts or not, but rather how the structure is put into practice.
Besides institutional traditions, the activity and the sort of information that is to be shared in multiagency collaboration are reliant on legislation. The legislation regulates the type of information that may be shared, in which circumstances it is permitted, how the information flow between the agencies is to be organized and for what purpose the information is to be shared. In a literature review on information sharing between public sector organizations, Yang and Maxwell (2011) state that adequate legislation regulating information flows is central for building inter-organizational relationships, organizational effectiveness and to minimize uncertainty. Also, the content and implementation of the legislation is key for citizens’ trust in processing of personal data by government agencies. On the other hand, inadequate legislation may cause information flows that violate privacy among citizens and prevent relevant information from being shared (Yang & Maxwell, 2011).

In many aspects, these arguments echo an ongoing debate on the CVE field on the balance between organizational efficiency and preserving the privacy of citizens. The Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN), an expert organization on CVE organized by the European Commission, has written extensively on the subject of multiagency work (e.g. RAN, 2016; 2017). Information sharing is seen as an important practice, but there are some recognized challenges. Among these, legal frameworks are conceived as particularly challenging. Partly, this is due to “a lack of knowledge of the legal limits and possibilities of data protection and privacy regulations with regard to information sharing and breaching confidentiality” (RAN, 2016, p. 516), which resonates with the potential unintended consequences and counterproductive outcomes of information sharing:

Authorities should respect the fundamental rights of the individual to confidentiality, privacy and freedom from interference by the State. Clients of healthcare services and legal professions in particular have a reasonable expectation that their information will not be shared without their consent. Where a professional does breach confidentiality, this could have permanent negative impacts on the therapeutic relationship, trust in the services in general, and future willingness to engage with social workers (RAN, 2016, p. 516)
Between the lines, this quote indicates what the following section explores: information sharing as a contested practice.

### 5.1 Sharing Information: A Contested Practice

Besides being one of the most prominent and publicised elements of CVE efforts, information sharing concerning individuals perceived to be at risk of radicalization is arguably the most contested and hotly debated part of CVE efforts globally (Heath-Kelly, Baker-Beall & Lee Jarvis, 2015). At its core lies the problematic relationship between constitutional rights regarding freedom of speech, religion and association, and the experienced need to intervene in early radicalization processes to prevent extremism. As suggested by several research literature reviews (e.g. Schimd, 2013; Borum, 2011), we know little of why some people choose to engage in political and religious violence and others do not, despite belonging to the same social or ideological milieu. Put differently, there are few findings to help, for instance, a teacher to distinguish between a process leading to radical but legal thoughts and behaviours, and a radicalization process leading to violence. As a result, critical streams in research have pointed to the subjective, often racially and cultural biased, reporting of suspected individuals in CVE efforts (Heath-Kelly et al., 2015).

There are relatively few empirical studies on how information sharing practices actually occur. Eijkman and Roodnat (2017) explored person-specific interventions to prevent religious extremism in Dutch municipalities. They found that referrals of individuals, based on alleged signs of radicalization, are assessed by multiagency teams which then construct an individual intervention strategy. Key elements for success, according to the professionals interviewed, were a solid network of professionals, “an expert in interpreting signs” (Eijkman & Roodnat, 2017, p. 195), a preventive focus rather than a repressive one and good information sharing among the partners. In many respects, this approach is similar to those being applied in the Nordic countries’ CVE policies. The study found that the practices labelled as preventive entailed monitoring individuals and disrupting certain extremist
activities. Despite a call for not labelling someone a terrorist too early, the municipal professionals were mostly concerned with obtaining information and correctly assessing referrals rather than broad, social community engagement (Eijkman & Roodnat, 2017).

Another qualitative study in the Netherlands explored youth workers’ perceptions of radicalization and how to detect such a process (van de Weert & Eijkman, 2018). In the context of CVE efforts, youth workers are seen as “particularly important for obtaining information about extremism. Youth workers are seen as the eyes and ears of the street” (ibid. 2018, p 2). Fulfilling this arguably securitized task has proven to be problematic in practice, since the distinction between violent extremism and radicalization is unclear to youth workers. Also, the quantity and quality of their training varies, opening the way for subjective and intuitive assumptions on what are radicalized ideas/behaviours. Interventions therefore become based on “a mix of facts, norms, values and personal feelings” (van de Weert & Eijkman, 2018, p.17) increasing the risk of deviant behaviour being interpreted as radicalization, mainly affecting young Muslims. If professionals continue to engage in such controlling activities, they risk losing the trust of the communities in which they work.

Turning to Scandinavia and empirical research on CVE information sharing chains, Andersson Malmros and Mattsson (2017) analysed 127 municipal CVE policies in Sweden and were critical of the information sharing practices proposed. In 15% of the policies, new CVE-specific information sharing chains were established. In these, there were instructions to report information about non-criminal behaviours and political and religious attitudes to the CVE coordinator within the municipality, most often the security chief/coordinator. The coordinator would then validate the information together with the police or the security police. According to the authors of the report, there were four major problems with information sharing chains of this kind to consider:

- There is no empirical research that indicates that a CVE coordinator is better equipped than front-line personnel in predicting who is in danger of becoming radicalized to the point of engaging in extremism. Hence, the young people at
risk should be dealt with according to already existing information sharing chains, passing on the information to the social services, which conduct an investigation and decided if social interventions are needed.

- CVE-specific information sharing chains will lead to breaches of public access to information and secrecy rules as they will transfer sensitive personal data about individuals from one municipal unit to another.
- Mapping religious and political thoughts and behaviours that are expressed within the frames of the law is considered problematic in relation to constitutional law regarding freedom of speech and freedom of religion.
- If young people find that (radical) opinions expressed in school or at afterschool/youth centres have been forwarded to the police when no breach of the law has occurred, it jeopardises the possibility to engage in preventive efforts within the context of schools and other social welfare activities. This might in fact have counterproductive effects on trust and legitimacy for the professionals and lead to young people not being willing to engage in discussions about controversial issues.

To conclude, while policymakers point to the need for more and better developed information sharing, critical streams in research warn of the risk of stigmatizing politically, religious and culturally deviant thoughts and groups. Also, there is a lively debate on how information sharing practices relate to fundamental individual rights. This result in professionals being uncertain about what kind of information can legally be shared, with whom and under what circumstances.

5.2 Legal Incentives for Crime Prevention and Collaboration

The police are regarded as key actors in Nordic CVE efforts. Besides having the obvious responsibility of upholding the national law and intervening against crime, all specific acts covering the police in the
Nordic countries also instruct the police to prevent crime. In relation to CVE efforts, this has given the police a key position in multiagency collaboration in the Nordic countries. But as shown in section 5 of this report, the role of the police differs in these countries’ multiagency approaches. To provide a legal perspective on why these differences occur, we have chosen to focus attention on the Police Acts of the Nordic countries and the incentives for multiagency collaboration and the prevention of crime proposed in those Acts. In appendix 2, complete references to all acts analysed in this and the following chapters are listed.

The *Danish Police Act* instructs the police in §1 to use prevention as a “method” to maintain the social functions and enhance safety, security, peace and order. Interestingly, the first formulation of their mission in §2 includes “to prevent criminal offenses” and later instructs the police to help other government agencies in their mission, once called upon and according to the law. This mission is later repeated in §15 where the use of force is regulated. These provisions are of a general nature, but specified in the Administration of Justice Act (*Retsplejeloven*) §112-114. §112 instruct the police chiefs to establish district councils consisting of the police chiefs and the mayors of relevant municipalities in each police territory. In these, trends in crime and questions of multiagency collaboration are to be discussed. According to §113, the police chief is also responsible for writing and presenting a plan on collaboration with the municipalities, government agencies and other relevant actors such as CSOs. Crime prevention and the (most) relevant specific municipal and state government activities are specified in §114, where social services, schools and mental health care are mentioned.

Turning to *Norway*, its Police Act is similar to the Danish Act in its emphasis on general crime prevention and collaboration, although it is not as specific. Already in §1, regarding the responsibilities and aims of the police force, the police are instructed to work “preventively (…) to be part of the total societal effort”. These formulations indicate a clear view of crime prevention as a multiagency effort and a core part of the Norwegian police’s work. §2 focus the police’s mission to “prevent crime” and “collaborate with other government agencies and organizations given assignments that interface with the activities of the
police”. In Chapter 2 §6, the police force is to achieve its mission through spreading information, counselling, maintaining order and preventive efforts.

The Police Acts of Finland and Sweden are less extensive and specific in their emphasis on crime prevention and collaboration with other government agencies. §2 in the Swedish Act points out that one of the tasks of the police is to prevent crime and according to §6, it should collaborate with other government agencies and relevant organizations, mentioning social services in particular with regard to young people’s concerns. In Finland’s Police Act, the only mention of a preventive and collaborative mission is in §1, where it is stated that the police should prevent crime and collaborate with other government agencies in order to maintain public safety.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal incentives for the police to engage in collaboration on crime prevention</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police Act §1, 2, 15: to prevent crime; to fulfil its and other agencies’ missions</td>
<td>Police Act §1: to prevent crime in collaboration with other government agencies</td>
<td>Police Act §1,2 and 6: to be part of the combined societal efforts to prevent crime</td>
<td>Police Act § 2 and 6: the police should collaborate with government agencies within social services to inform them of any measures required by them</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven) §112-114: police chief should act to establish cooperation for the purpose of crime prevention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Legal incentives for the police to engage in cooperation.

To sum up, all the Nordic countries have assigned the police a clear crime prevention mission. Indeed, a collaborative crime prevention mission is central in all these countries and included in the legislative history of the Acts. But although the centrality of a crime prevention task indicates similarity, a closer reading shows differences in emphasis on the matter in these countries. The instructions to the Danish police are more extensive and specific on this matter. This is evident in
particular in the section instructing the chief of police to initiate and lead crime prevention activities in collaboration with other government agencies and organizations. Crime prevention and collaboration are also highly emphasised and recurring in Norway’s Police Act, but specified in less details. Sweden’s Police Act does not have the same focus on crime prevention and collaboration, but does point out social services as a collaborative partner. Finland is arguably the Nordic country with the least focus on crime prevention and collaboration with other government agencies in its Police Act.

5.3 Obstacles for Information Sharing

Regarding obstacles for information sharing, there is a high degree of similarity in the material from the Nordic countries. Concerning what kind of information can be shared, the national constitutions, the European Convention on Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights serve as general frameworks. They distinctly advocate for the inviolability of universal human rights, protecting the individual’s rights to privacy, freedom of opinion and advocate tolerance for divergent political and religious views. However, these types of conventions are of overarching character that we have chosen not to list them in Table 7, but instead treat them as general pillars underpinning the work of all public services. As Helmius (2016) states, these conventions and the declaration should have a considerable impact on limiting what types of information can be shared in CVE efforts. The importance of these limitations becomes more concrete in the Acts restricting the public sector’s gathering, storage and sharing of private information about their citizens. The Acts express a generally restrictive attitude towards information sharing concerning strictly personal or sensitive matters, for example political and religious views. As a general rule, such information cannot be collected, stored and shared between government agencies. Thus, we can conclude that the general attitudes expressed in these Acts are similar, stating that no personal data, as defined in the constitutions of the Nordic countries, Data Protection
Acts and the Public Administration Acts (or similar), should be shared between government agencies.

Children and young people under 18 are given special attention and protection. Norway’s Children Act (Lov om barn og foreldre) §6-7 instructs professionals working with children not to disclose any sensitive information. In Sweden, the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (Offentlighets- och sekretesslagstiftningen) states in Chapter 26, §1 that secrecy is particularly strong in social services where children are clients. Finland stands out with a comprehensive act on client rights in relation to the work done by social services, emphasizing the right to privacy among those who are in contact with the social services (Laki sosiaalihuollon asiakkaan asemasta ja oikeuksista/Act on Client rights in the Social Services).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Administration Act (Forvaltnings-loven)</strong></td>
<td>Act on publicity in governmental activities (Laki viranomaisten toiminnan julkisuudesta) - §23-24: information that concerns a person’s political and other private views, involvement in CSOs or family circumstances are subject to professional secrecy</td>
<td>Public Administration Act (Lov om behandlings-måten i forvaltnings-saker) - §13: government agencies must be restrictive in sharing information</td>
<td>Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (Offentlighets- och sekretesslagstiftningen): - Chapter 7, §8: confidential information is not to be shared and used outside one’s own agency - Chapter 26, 1§: particularly strong secrecy provisions within social services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- §28: Restrictions on sharing personal data regarding for example race, religion and membership of associations</td>
<td>Act on Client rights in the Social Services (Laki sosiaalihuollon asiakkaan asemasta ja oikeuksista): - §14: Social welfare documents that contain information about social services</td>
<td>Children Act (Lov om barn og foreldre) - § 6-7: professional secrecy to stop others from acquiring sensitive information</td>
<td>Education Act (Skollagen) - Chapter 26, §11: secrecy required in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

113
Table 7. Legal obstacles to sharing information

The legal obstacles to information sharing regarding personal matters are hence to be considered as strong in all the Nordic countries. There must be certain *purposes* and *circumstances* that allow the *possibility* of such information being shared.
5.4 Possibilities for Information Sharing

Starting with the similarities, a general possibility, found in all Nordic countries, is that information can be shared if consent is given by the individual (or guardian) who is the object of concern. However, the type of information shared and with which agencies must be relevant with regard to the problems and possible solutions. Under such conditions, it is possible to derogate from (or bypass) the privacy and secrecy provisions. Another general possibility for sharing information is if it is deemed necessary for the other government agencies to fulfil their respective tasks. If “necessary” were to be interpreted generously, personal data regarding individuals could always be shared. However, these provisions are not mentioned in the national CVE policies, indicating that the interpretation of “necessary” is not generous but quite strict.

Sweden, Denmark and Norway all have a provision regarding reporting of children at risk, but differ regarding the flow of information. In the Danish Social Services Act (Serviceloven), §153 states that children at risk should be reported to the municipality, while in Norway and Sweden the provisions are more detailed, and specifically require reporting to social services. The National Board of Health and Welfare in Sweden found that this provision, belonging to the Social Services Act (Socialtjänstlagen) Chapter 14 §1 is applicable in cases of extremism and radicalization. However, the information flow is restricted to the social services receiving this information from the police and not the other way around (if the purpose is prevention). This serves as an indicator of a general line in Sweden’s attitude to at-risk young people: the social services are responsible for such tasks.

Sweden’s Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (Offentlighets- och sekretesslagstiftningen) chapter 10 §27 contains a general provision which instructs professionals to derogate from secrecy provisions if the value in sharing the information is deemed higher than withholding it. This could be utilized in cases where it could be anticipated that derogation from secrecy rules would prevent a serious crime (e.g. a terrorist attack) from being committed. However,
the application of this section to CVE efforts was contested in a recent official commission of inquiry (SOU 2018:65), since the problems of accurately pointing out who was at risk of becoming a terrorist were seen as too difficult and risky in relation to individual rights. Similarly, but not as explicitly, the Public Administration Act (Forvaltningsloven) points to “superior interests” while both Norwegian and Finnish Acts point to “danger to life and health” as potential reasons to derogate from secrecy rules.

There are a few sections that more directly touch on information sharing for crime prevention purposes and those are referred to in national CVE policies. In the Nordic countries, arguably the most well-known is §115 in the Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven). It states that government agencies can share information about individuals’ private circumstances, if necessary, to prevent a crime and to help socially vulnerable or already convicted young people. In these policies, the SSP is mentioned as such an arena in which information sharing can take place. Special attention is also given to radicalization, as those convicted and released but still radicalized continue to be of some interest. When reviewing both national and local policy documents in Denmark, it is obvious that this section is central to information sharing among government agencies in CVE efforts. Practices in Danish multiagency collaborations are built around this section and, when they are used, legitimize most kinds of information sharing if the purpose is crime prevention. This more generous attitude towards information sharing is strengthened by §49 in the Social Services Act (Serviceloven), which states that information can be shared among social welfare professionals in preventive work around vulnerable youth. §12b in the same Act is entirely focused on radicalized individuals over 18 years of age, and states that the municipality is obliged to offer free counselling but can also engage in its own outreach work to affected individuals. The application of this provision goes hand-in-hand with information sharing between the security police and the municipalities about these individuals.

The only comparable provision to §115 in the Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven) can, quite surprisingly, be found in Sweden. In chapter 10, §18a in the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (Offentlighets- och sekretesslagstiftningen) it is stated that information from
other government agencies can be shared with the police if circumstances indicate that a young person is about to commit criminal acts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>§115 in the Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven)</th>
<th>Chapter 10, §18a in the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (Offentlighets- och sekretesslagstiftningen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The police may disclose information about individuals' purely private relations with other authorities, if the disclosure is deemed necessary for the sake of</td>
<td>Secrecy pursuant to Chapter 26. Section 1 does not prevent information relating to an individual who has not turned twenty-one years from being submitted to the Police Authority, if</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) the crime prevention cooperation (SSP cooperation),</td>
<td>1. there is a risk that the young person will engage in criminal activities because of special circumstances;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) the police cooperation with the social authorities and the social and treatment psychiatry as part of the efforts towards socially vulnerable persons (PSP cooperation) or</td>
<td>2. The task can be assumed to help prevent it, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) the cooperation between the Prison and Probation Service, the social authorities and the police (the KSP cooperation) as part of the efforts towards</td>
<td>3. In view of planned or ongoing efforts for the young person or for other special reasons, it is not inappropriate for the information to be disclosed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) convicted, released from institutions under the Prison and Probation Service,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) sentenced under the age of 18, released from institutions, etc. outside the Prison and Probation Service, where they are placed in accordance with section 78 (1). 2 of the Act on the Enforcement of Punishment, etc., and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) persons released from pre-trial detention or other detention measures under Chapter 70 if deemed to be radicalized or at risk of becoming.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCS. 2. To the same extent as mentioned in subsection (1). 1, an authority may disclose information about individuals to the police and other authorities included in the forms of cooperation referred to in paragraph”</td>
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</table>

Table 8. Comparison between information sharing paragraphs

No particular multiagency approach is mentioned in the Swedish Act, but the instructions in this section could be interpreted and used in a similar way as in Denmark. When reviewing the purposes of the law, this interpretation is fortified. However, the previously mentioned official commission of inquiry (SOU 2018:65) reviewed this section,
but did not recognize it as appropriate to be used for early intervention in cases of potential radicalization. This is motivated by the uncertain link between radical/extreme ideas and criminal extremist behaviour, and too generous information sharing would, according to the official commission of inquiry, risk violating privacy rights of those concerned. However, the paragraph could be applicable in cases were a youth is suspected to be about to embark on a travel in order to join terrorist groups (SOU 2018:65).

In table 10 (below), we have listed the relevant acts and paragraphs that enable information sharing among public agencies in the Nordic countries.
### Legal possibilities for sharing information about individuals between government agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administration of Justice Act</strong> <em>(Retsplejeloven)</em>&lt;br&gt;- § 115: Crime prevention purposes</td>
<td><strong>Act on publicity in governmental activities</strong> <em>(Laki viranomaisten toiminnan julkisuudesta)</em>&lt;br&gt;- §26/29: Consent; Necessary for another government agency to fulfil its task</td>
<td><strong>Children Act (Lov om barn og foreldre)</strong>&lt;br&gt;- § 6-7: if necessary, to fulfil its task; Danger of serious injury or threat to life; Domestic situation threatening children’s health</td>
<td><strong>Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act</strong> <em>(Offentlighets- och sekretesslagstiftningen)</em>&lt;br&gt;- Chapter 10, §18a: risk of young people carrying out a crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Administration Act</strong> <em>(Forvaltningsloven)</em>&lt;br&gt;- §28, part 2-3: Consent; Superior interest; Necessary for other agency to fulfil its task</td>
<td><strong>Police Act (Poliisilaki)</strong>&lt;br&gt;- Chapter 4 §2: right to receive information from other government agencies if the information is not restricted by other legislation</td>
<td><strong>Public Administration Act</strong> <em>(Lov om behandlingsmåten i forvaltningssaker)</em>&lt;br&gt;- §13: Consent; Anonymization; When publicly known; Necessary to fulfil own task; Danger of serious injury or threat to life</td>
<td>- Chapter 10, §27: The General provision – the purpose of sharing information is more important than withholding it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Services Act</strong> <em>(Serviceloven)</em>&lt;br&gt;- §12b: The municipalities are obliged to initiate free and targeted counselling measures for citizens over the age of 18, where there is concern about radicalization. The municipality can do outreach work and, on its own, can make contact with citizens who are deemed at risk of being radicalized.&lt;br&gt;- §49: Municipal employees in schools, youth and children’s services and healthcare services (including dentists) can share information about “exposed youth” if necessary for effective prevention</td>
<td><strong>Social Care Act</strong> <em>(Sosiaalihuoltolaki)</em>&lt;br&gt;- §41: collaborate with other actors and relatives if in the best interests of the client. This might include sharing of information about the client.</td>
<td><strong>Social Service Act</strong> <em>(Lov om sosiale tjenester i arbeids- og velferdssystemen)</em>&lt;br&gt;- §45. Public employees in contact with young people must report the matter to Social Services if a child is in need of support</td>
<td>- Chapter 12, §2: consent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth Act (Nuorisolaki)</strong>:&lt;br&gt;- § 9-11: consent&lt;br&gt;- § 28: right to share information with the Police if danger to health and life exist, or to obstruct a threatening action.</td>
<td><strong>Act on Client rights in the Social Services (Laki)</strong></td>
<td>- Chapter 27, §1-2: Consent; Necessary to fulfil own task</td>
<td>- Chapter 27, §1-2: Consent; Necessary to fulfil own task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chapter 7 §2: if necessary in order for other government agencies to fulfil their tasks</td>
<td><strong>Act on Client rights in the Social Services Act</strong> <em>(Lov om klientrettene i arbeids- og velferdssystemen)</em>&lt;br&gt;- Chapter 14, §1: Public employees in contact with young people must report the matter to social services</td>
<td>- Chapter 35, §1: if necessary to prevent crime</td>
<td>- Chapter 14, §1:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 9. Possibilities for sharing information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>§153: Public employees must report the matter to the municipality if a child is in need of support</td>
<td>sosiaalihuollon asiakkaan asemasta ja oikeuksista):</td>
<td></td>
<td>if a child is in need of support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§16: Consent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public Administration Act (Frövaltningslagn):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§18: Right to share information if danger to lives or health</td>
<td>- §20, 22: Social Services has the right to obtain confidential information about clients’ circumstances in relation to investigations and other parts of their work</td>
<td></td>
<td>- §6: Government agencies should assist other agencies within the boundaries of the law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§25: Public employees must report the matter to social services if a child is in need of support</td>
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### 5.5 Conclusions

**Police and crime prevention:** All Nordic countries take a general position that the police are to engage in crime prevention as a core part of their task. However, there are some differences:

- The Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven) §112-114 instructs the police to create structures that can be used for crime prevention purposes. No other Nordic country has similar provisions.

- In quantitative terms, the Police Acts of Denmark and Norway place greater emphasis on prevention and collaboration than do Sweden and Finland.

**Obstacles and possibilities for information sharing:** We find both similarities and differences between the Nordic countries with regard to the obstacles and possibilities of information sharing. In all, they are
close to identical with regard to emphasising the need to respect constitutional rights regarding freedom of speech, freedom of religion and the right to privacy.

- Individual rights concerning freedom of speech and religion, protected by the constitutions of the Nordic countries, restrict what type of information that can be shared between government agencies.

- In Acts that regulate the government agencies and their information sharing, secrecy is the general rule. This rule is applied particularly strictly concerning children.

- Finland has an Act regulating clients’ rights in relation to actions by social services, the only one of its kind in the Nordic countries.

Regarding possibilities, the most surprising finding was when comparing the content of specific provisions in Denmark and Sweden in relation to how they appear to play out in practice. In Sweden, this debate has been ongoing over the years (i.e. Ranstorp, 2019), often with reference to Denmark as a role model. It has been proposed that new laws that make it easier to share information should be adopted and an official commission of inquiry (SOU 2018:65) was launched to shed light on the issue. However, the findings in this report question what impact new legal frameworks would have. This is due to the highly comparable formulations in §115 of *The Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven)* and Chapter 10, §18a in the *Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (Offentlighets- och sekretesslagstiftningen)*. Both of these sections are explicit that derogations from secrecy are permitted in order to prevent a crime. Despite this fact, the Danish authorities are able to use the same formulation as a foundation for information sharing aimed at the prevention of extremism, while Swedish authorities do not find it appropriate to use this for that purpose (SOU 2018:65). Expanding the comparison to Norway, no legal framework exists that makes information sharing for crime prevention purposes possible without extraordinary circumstances or consent. But when reviewing the national and local CVE policies and practices in Norway (see section 3 and 4), information sharing in crime preventive purposes is still advocated. And despite the dubious legal support towards
information sharing in Sweden, such practices are to some extent also prevalent in Sweden (Andersson Malmros & Mattsson, 2017).

- Consent from the individual of interest is a general option available to government agencies for sharing information

- All the Nordic countries identify, in different Acts, a superior interest and/or danger to life and health as possible reasons for derogating from secrecy rules. In the case of imminent terror attacks or plots, these rules would be applicable

- Young people at risk are a special target group in the Nordic countries. To some degree, this opens up possibilities to share information

- The Danish authorities have the most extensive options for information sharing, in particular with reference to §115 in The Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven). Sweden has a similar section, Chapter 10 §18a in the Swedish Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (Offentlighet- och sekretesslagstiftningen), but it is not utilized in relation to CVE

- The Danish Acts are the only ones that use radicalization as a term: §12b in the Social Services Act (Serviceloven) and §115 in the Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven)

- In relation to previous research on Nordic CVE efforts and the practices that are advocated in section 4, there are indications that national policy (Acts and Ordinances) are decoupled from the practical work being done at the local level.
6. Summary

This final part of the report begins with a brief summary of the findings of the mapping of policy for multiagency work in the Nordic countries. The summary is followed by reflections that highlight some of the identified benefits and challenges of collaborative approaches to handling violent extremism among young people. Finally, we provide a concluding discussion where policy as discourse along with institutional logic and hybrid organization theories are applied.

6.1 Organization

The mapping of organizational structure focused on how policy described multiagency approaches concerned with CVE efforts. The mapping found six aspects of multiagency work in the Nordic countries:

- The Nordic countries all use a three-level structure for multiagency approaches. These align the political level with the executive level that governs practice.

- Already established structures for multiagency work for preventing crime in general are now being utilized for handling issues associated with violent extremism. The cooperative way of working with “wicked problems” has a long-standing tradition in Denmark and the Danish SSP model serves as an inspiration for SLT in Norway and the Anchor teams (Ankkuri) in Finland which have more or less national rules for
implementing multiagency approaches. In Sweden (as in Norway), there are no obligations to or rules for establishing SSP(f).

- A way to incorporate CVE in multiagency work is to provide additional expertise in the form of Info houses, Kunskapshus (knowledge centres), CVE coordinators, police councils, etc.

- The involved actors are primarily affiliated with the police, together with the social services and the healthcare system are influential components of multiagency teams followed by schools and youth services. Finland is the exception, as schools and youth workers are not considered to be permanent partners in the collaboration. However, Finland is the only country that includes psychiatric nurses.

- The police are the main government agency in charge of multiagency cooperation, especially in Finland but also in Denmark. Even if the Norwegian SLT model is placed under the governance of municipalities, the local chief of police and the police council along with the mayor generally constitute the steering committee. In Sweden, the SSP(f) is managed by social services which, together with schools as municipal organizations make agreements with the regionally governed police to set up local SSP(f) teams.

Civil society and its organizations are considered to be valuable in safeguarding society against anti-democratic forces. Their position as voluntary and often unburdened by obligations make them better able to build trust and social relationships with young individuals in particular. CSOs are frequently mentioned in policy as resources and potential partners; however, there are some legal restrictions on making them into permanent partners
6.2 Recommended Practices

The section designated for recommended practices initially searched for practices mentioned in national documents. The analysis revealed that these were virtually non-existent. The recommended practices found in policy are primarily found in police recommendations and handbooks providing guides for setting up a multiagency collaboration, thus these are highly conceptual. Potential actions that can be taken by social services and schools are not very specific. Schools are recommended to focus on building resilience through teaching about democracy. However, in some cases they are recommended to observe and detect behaviours that could indicate radicalization. Social services are positioned as connector for directing clients to services. Social services can facilitate contacts with relevant services and guide and support at-risk individuals. In Denmark for instance, the Social Services Act obliges social services to intervene if individuals over 18 show signs of entering, or wanting to exit, violent extremist milieus.

The recommended practices we have focused on are: (1) what is described as elements of success and what are the recommendations made for making the approach work? and (2) What are the tools or techniques mentioned in policy for the concrete work in practice with individuals? In short, the recommendations focus on creating relationships, mutual trust, responsibility, accountability, clarity, coordination and local understanding for achieving success. There are some differences between what are deemed to be relevant tools and techniques.

- Mutual trust and relationships between involved agencies, and with the social environment in the local community and the young individual in focus, are crucial. Trust and relationships can be incentives for bypassing obstacles for sharing information as willingness to give consent may be facilitated by relational trust. This also applies to trust between colleagues within interagency collaborations, as trust can informally bypass legal restrictions.
• Responsibility, accountability and clarity are motivated by the effectiveness of multiagency work and refer to defining and allocating the resources of different agencies and their collaboration as such. The need for clear flows of information is also essential for effective work and something that is in constant need of reassessment and sharing between the partners. Clearly defined frameworks can reduce internal conflicts and streamline the organization.

• Local understanding and individualization are necessary for obtaining an overview of potential problems, contemporary attitudes and constellations. Local understanding also provides a shorter way to access local resources such as civil society organizations and makes social networks easier to activate. The resources needed are reliant on individual needs, thus there are no off-the-shelf methods; actions need to be adapted to local resources and individual needs.

There are some differences between the Nordic countries concerning recommended practices and these differences are most notable among the tools and techniques.

• The Danish approach focuses on the individual and assessments of individual risk and resilience factors. Resources and motivation are important starting points for an intervention. The focus is placed in relational work as communication and mutual trust are emphasised and the use of specially assigned mentors is advised.

• Finland’s tools and techniques are centred around the well-being of the client and on reducing the risk of him or her committing crimes in the future. In policy there are a plethora of templates and lists that are meant to be helpful for assessing the problem and how to intervene. Also, there are detailed instructions which indicate a need for streamlining and rectifying the actions of the anchor teams in different areas. The Finnish approach is also more focused on legal aspects and informing the client of the risks and possible repercussions of their actions, which implies a more correctional approach.
• The Norwegian approach is similar to the Danish approach and rests on a need to build trust and resilience. Conversational aspects such as “conversation intervention”, mediation and reconciliation are prominent among the recommendations. The models seem to have social psychology foundations and support and guidance for parents and from mentors are advocated.

• The Swedish approach centres on relationships and trust. Trust is framed as the prerequisite for individuals being willing to contact the police or social services to get support. Similar to the Norwegian policies, the Swedish approach focuses on conversation, relationships and reconciliation. Cooperation between actors is promoted as a way of achieving success.

### 6.3 Advocating Multiagency Approaches

In sections committed to highlighting how multiagency approaches are advocated, we have singled out sections in the national and local action plans that contain the motivations and arguments for using or establishing multiagency approaches for handling issues related to radicalization or violent extremism. We have identified three main themes among the arguments used: (1) Using existing structures and organizations for extended purposes; (2) Gathering and sharing knowledge and expertise; and (3) Coordinating actions for a more effective and efficient response.

• The use of existing structures and organizations is convenient and allows the utilization of established routines for assessment, reporting and following up individuals who cause concern or are regarded as being at risk of radicalization. The multiagency organizations in focus for this study are primarily dedicated to general issues and interventions in criminal or delinquent behaviour. This may make them into one of the most qualified organizations for handling “wicked problems” The use of existing structures may also be economically beneficial since resources can be quickly brought together for
a rapid response. A multipurpose, multiagency structure may also be convenient, especially since problems connected with violent extremism and violent radicalization simply do not exist in some municipalities and regions.

- Gathering and sharing knowledge and expertise is put forward as a potential benefit which, for the common good, is made possible through cooperation between different fields of expertise. In a multiagency organization, each profession and institution brings to it a different perspective and a range of instruments that can facilitate the work. The discourse of expert knowledge is applied to flows of knowledge between agencies:

- Experts in the field can provide training, thus actors within multiagency organizations can be a resource to regional and municipal authorities and other actors such as first-line personnel. The police are put forward as the main source of available expertise.

- Experts within primarily additional units can provide knowledge, intelligence and information concerning individuals or groups. This kind of knowledge can be used for identifying individuals who might constitute a risk to society. Thus, it is considered essential that this information is handed over to the multiagency organizations.

- Knowledge about how to assess and detect at-risk signs is put forward as an especially valuable form of expertise. The source of such expertise is supposed to be research.

- To coordinate cooperation for a more effective and efficient response refers primarily to the possibility to lower thresholds and bypass boundaries between agencies. The access to a variety of perspectives enables flexibility and adaptation to different cases and circumstances.
6.4 Legal Frameworks

The analysis of the legal frameworks focused on: (1) mapping out legal incentives for the police to engage in collaboration on crime prevention; (2) legal obstacles to government agencies sharing information for crime prevention purposes; (3) the legal possibilities for government agencies to share information for crime prevention purposes.

- Beginning with the legal incentives for police engagement in collaborative crime prevention work, the analysis showed that the collaborative crime prevention task is central in all countries and included in the initial provisions of these countries’ Police Acts. However, differences were also noted. The Danish Police Act is the most extensive and specific in regard to its crime prevention task, most prominently exemplified by the sections in the Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven) instructing the chief of police to initiate and lead crime prevention in collaboration with other agencies and organizations. Crime prevention and collaboration is also emphasised and recurring terms in the Norwegian Police Act, but less specified, as it does not include any instructions on the forms and responsibilities for such work. The Swedish Police Act does not have the same overall preventive and collaborative focus, but in contrast to the other countries does specify social services as a particular important collaborative partner when it comes to young people. Finland is arguably the Nordic country with the least focus on crime prevention and collaboration with other agencies judging by its Police Act.

- The legal obstacles for government agencies are rather similar in all countries. The national constitutions, the European Convention on Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights serve as general frameworks that protect individual rights to privacy, freedom of opinion and tolerance for divergent political and religious opinions. These general frameworks are specified in the respective countries Administrative/Secrecy Acts (see table
7). The attitude expressed in these is, in general, restrictive towards all forms of information sharing that involves personal matters (e.g. political and religious opinions/associations). Instead, there must be certain purposes and circumstances that open up the possibility for such information sharing to take place.

- The legal possibilities for government agencies to share information for crime prevention purposes are rather varied between the countries. Starting with the similarities, a general possibility, found in all Nordic countries, is that information can be shared if consent is given by the individual (or guardian) who is the object of concern. Another commonality is that “superior interests” and/or “dangers to life and health” are possible grounds for derogating from secrecy rules. In the case of imminent terror attacks or plots, these rules would be applicable. Regarding differences, Danish authorities have the most extensive possibilities for information sharing, in particular with reference to §115 in the Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven). Sweden has a similar section, Chapter 10 §18a in the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (Offentlighets- och sekretesslagstiftningen), but it is not utilized in relation to CVE.
7. Analytical Discussion

The last part of this report contains our analytical remarks and discussion of the findings. This section applies the theoretical framework introduced in Sections 2.1. and 2.2 and deepens the discussion on the discursive content of the policies and how that helps us to understand the institutional logics of multiagency collaboration. This section applies a critical perspective meant to probe the assumptions and how problems are constituted by policy. The critical stance is not to be understood as negative criticism, but an attempt to feed further enquiries and deepen knowledge about the conditions for multiagency collaboration in CVE efforts. We will start by recalling and applying our theoretical framework in relation to CVE policies in general but swiftly move on and, through the lens of discourse analysis, present an analysis of how different institutional logics are co-existing, competing and mixing in everyday CVE efforts.

7.1 How Policy Matters

Policy texts are in this analytical section regarded as manifestations of discursive truth and knowledge. Such truth and knowledge not only hold the prerogative for explaining the problem of radicalization and violent extremism, but also contain representations of the problem leading to seemingly rational solutions (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016).

As Heath-Kelley (2012) argues, the knowledge that enables and produces policy and actions rests on the discursive explanatory models for the problem at hand. This would also work in a reciprocal direction
in line with the Foucauldian understanding that discourses systematically form the object of which they speak and therefore are active in the production of truth and knowledge (i.e. Foucault, 1997).

From another angle, policy texts serve a more material function. They are transmitters of language and discourse that “lends meaning and legitimacy to material practices and in doing so constructs the cognitive structures that underpin institutions” (Phillips & Malhotra, 2017, p. 402). Put differently, if a given CVE practice (e.g. multiagency information sharing) repeatedly gets acknowledged as important in CVE policy, this perception becomes legitimized and might, over time, evolve into an objective truth - an institutionalized way of organizing CVE efforts. Once these cognitive schemes have been established, they become self-regulating mechanisms for organizational activity (Philips & Malhotra, 2017).

However, even if a way of organizing CVE efforts becomes institutionalized and gains a taken-for-granted status, the meanings associated with the same form can be heterogeneous among the participants and observers. In multiagency collaboration, professionals with different institutional logics guiding their work come together in hybrid organizations to produce CVE efforts. Their respective logics influence the collective identity (e.g. occupation group) they relate to, what and how they understand problems, what they see as goals and meaning in their work, and the strategies they use to handle different situations. By exploring these aspects and the discourse surrounding them in CVE policy, distinctive institutional logics can be discerned.

This is an important task for research to direct, since multiagency work is often viewed from a functionalist perspective (see Section 1.6), focusing on advantages, success stories and “best practices”, while neglecting potential conflicts and problems. Indeed, the hybridity inherent in multiagency collaboration makes them into “arenas of contradictions” (Pache & Santos, 2013, p. 972) and thus central for understanding the social reality of multiagency CVE efforts.
Two logics: Security and Social Care

When analysing the empirical findings in Sections 3, 4 and 5, we see two ideal types of institutional logics prevailing as influential in CVE efforts: a social care logic (SCL) and a societal security logic (SSL). As institutional logics, they influence the approaches of public sector organizations and employees to problems such as radicalization, their actions and the meanings they ascribe to their work. Using the framework of institutional logics developed by Thornton et al. (2012), the SCL and the SSL can be deconstructed into ideal types accordingly:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collective identity</th>
<th>Societal security logic</th>
<th>Social care logic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police, security police, security managers, etc.</td>
<td>Teachers, social workers, youth workers, mental health workers, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>-The physical safety of citizens/employees/public facilities</td>
<td>-The well-being of pupils/clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Order and law abiding</td>
<td>-Safe-guard individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Ensure that the rights of pupils/clients are protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies</td>
<td>Authoritarian/repressive: prevent, detect, protect, surveil, arrest, incapacitate</td>
<td>Relational: prevent, detect, protect, support, strengthen, emancipate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground for attention</td>
<td>Cases of (potential) rule-breaking behaviour</td>
<td>Cases of social/psychological/physical concern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground for authority</td>
<td>Chain of command, centralized decision-making</td>
<td>Autonomous: decentralized decision-making</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11. Institutional logics in CVE efforts

Neither the SSL nor the SCL are exclusively developed for CVE efforts, but can be found to be relevant for many other types of activities. For example, the SCL is used in schools, social services, afterschool/youth centres, in many CSOs and in integration efforts, while the SSL is performed by public and private sector security organizations. However, it is only in theory that logics are as “pure” and singular as in table 11. Rather, it is recognized that one of the
advocated benefits of multiagency work is that it allows a mixing of logics (see Section 4.4).

Neither is a logic static, but is in fact translated locally and performed into being. In that process, it co-exists, mixes and competes with other logics in everyday life (Pallas, Fredriksson & Wedlin, 2016). A given social space is seldom completely homogenous (consisting of one logic or the other) but is heterogeneous and the use of logics depends on the problem and context. With that said, some logics and discourses attain a hegemonic position in relation to others. In practice, this means that certain logics and discourses gets used more frequently and might become regarded as “common sense” and therefore guide behaviour.

**Figure 2.** Areas in which each institutional logic as ideal types, co-exists, competes and mixes in policy

In figure 2, we map out the areas in which each institutional logic as ideal types, co-exists, competes and mixes in policy. As a concern is directed to the multiagency collaboration structure, professionals interpret it in relation to existing logics – the SSL and the SCL. There is an area of co-existence between the logics as they both uses prevention and detecting of problems as strategies to achieve their goals. This means that practices for handling concerns about young people are legitimate and important practices for both logics. However,
it is apparent that the concern will be interpreted and handled differently depending on the logic activated. The ground for attention and the types of problems they focus on are distinctive as cases of (potential) rule-breaking are central to the SSL, while the SCL instead focuses on signs of individual concern that might harm the individual in question. This difference of attention derives from their respective goals and the inherent meanings of their work. Such differences might provoke conflict when a concern is to be dealt with in a multiagency structure, as the SSL approach uses “hard measures” and control to reach their goals, while the SCL approach utilizes “soft measures” and relational work. Which type of solution is to be used? The character of the solutions also affects the grounds of authority: the SSL rests on a more formal vertical chain of command where decision-making is more centralized, while the individual character of the work conducted by collectives connected to the SCL is more horizontal and autonomous. Here, we see a potential risk of conflict as, for example, the police are more inclined to give orders and are used to being listened to, while social workers have a more decentralized way of making decisions (i.e. Brown et al., 2010).

Accordingly, there are reasons to believe that multiagency work is far from non-problematic and without conflict in hybrid spaces such as in the SSP(f), Anchor teams, SSP and SLT of the Nordic countries. If a hybrid organization is to be effective, such conflicts need to be dealt with. In the policies, we see two complementary strategies for dealing with these conflicts: making one logic hegemonic and/or mixing them.

**A hegemonic discourse and logic in policy**

With regards to the policy field, the police have a prominent role in the multiagency work in CVE efforts in all four countries. To a varying extent, the police are also the governing authority for this multiagency work. This is probably due to CVE efforts being incorporated into already established crime prevention structures. For example, in Denmark the chief of police is by law instructed to initiate and plan crime prevention collaboration with other government agencies. The hegemonic position of the police in the CVE arena is also evident in the national action plans where expertise, responsibility and actions assigned to the police are prevalent. Put together, the police, to a large
extent, have the authority to decide how the work is supposed to be organized. Considering the discursive alignment between violent extremism and terrorism, this is not a surprise. Foucault (1977) discussed how the police as representatives of the state have the function of maintaining discipline and order in the society as a whole. Hence, the goals of CVE efforts mainly become about preserving societal safety and to safeguard democracy against threats. With that being said, this analysis is based on the discourse found in policy. As mentioned previously, policy is often decoupled from practice (Clarke, 1999; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and the police are probably also acting in line with a SCL approach in some situations (e.g. the Radicalization Contacts in Norway and police preventive units in Denmark). The extent and characteristics of such decoupling will be further explored in the continuation of the HEX-NA project.

A hegemonic discourse tends to reproduce itself. As Lindekilde (2015) notes, the development and setting of policies are often incremental, and this is also the case in the Nordic countries. For instance, the Swedish CVE approach was initially governed by the Ministry of Culture due to its focus on democracy and socio-political measures and its base in SCL. This stance has changed in recent years, moving towards a security discourse and today has its starting point in crime policy. Consequently, Swedish CVE efforts have been replaced under the Ministry of Justice and the new national coordinating office for CVE has been organized as part of the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention. This development can be understood as a consequence of increased (and more focused) extremist activities and events in the world and region, making citizens more prone to call for firmer policies and penalizing approaches. Assertive approaches and clear messages can make people feel safer and more protected, which most likely creates trust in the authorities that can guarantee security.

As mentioned, the CVE approaches in the Nordic countries traditionally rest upon crime prevention and the multiagency approaches are developed primarily to prevent future crimes from being committed. An example of this is that the Swedish Centre for Preventing Violent Extremism firmly acknowledges that their point of departure is always penal policy. However, this foundation can seem to make other agencies unsure of what their tasks are in relation to
preventing crime. Such uncertainty is found in an evaluation of police council cooperation with SLT signed by the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security (2014). The evaluation shows that representatives from other agencies (other than the police) report uncertainties about formalities and the agenda of the cooperation. This indicates that the police have a more prominent position and that other actors experience a need to follow their lead. In line with Foucault’s (1993) argumentation, the ruling discourse represents the truth and valid knowledge and in best-case scenarios this hegemonic position can ensure authoritative and legitimate trust, while in worst case scenarios it could induce uncertainties, distancing and even fear.

Accordingly, a tentative conclusion of our mapping is that the policing discourse indicates that the SSL in some respects has prevailed and gained a hegemonic position in relation to the SCL. In CVE and the hybrid space in which multiagency work is carried out, the central goals, objectives and grounds for attention reflect the SSL. In reference to the findings in this report, a hypothesis is that the police in most countries become the ground for authority: the collective identity that make the final decisions on how to act in the multiagency spaces. In practice, this would mean that most concerns about radicalization will be interpreted as a (potential) security problem and thus lend legitimacy to SSL strategies as a solution. Hence, the hegemonic truth and knowledge explaining the problem also give seemingly rational solutions (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016). This finding, however, is not without exceptions or national differences.

The following graph provides a general description of some of the differences and commonalities in the prevailing logics and specific focal points found in the Nordic countries’ policies, legal frameworks and recommended practices.
Figure 3. Focal points for prevailing logics based on policy data

The graph illustrates how Denmark, Finland and to some extent Norway are leaning towards a more decisive SSL than Sweden. The Info houses in Denmark and the “Radicalization contacts” in Norway are both prominent examples of the police having a central role in CVE efforts, often in close cooperation or as parts of the multiagency work. By contrast, Norway have municipal SLT coordinators to align different actors and Sweden has CVE coordinators employed by the municipality and the multiagency work is led by social services. Possibly connected to this, Sweden is also the country with the most restrictive attitude towards information sharing for crime prevention purposes and the information flow is directed towards social services rather than the police or the SLT/SSP/Anchor team structures. Finland is less guided by the SCL than the other Nordic countries, mainly since its social services, afterschool/youth centres and education services are given little attention in the analysed policies. Instead, the involvement of mental health instances indicate that the Finnish approach is less inclined to consider the social and relational aspects of violent extremism and more inclined to explain radicalization as a mental health phenomenon, which is also explicitly formulated in the national
action plan (FI, 2016). To summarize and compare, Denmark and Norway seem to have a more similar approach to CVE while Finland and Sweden contrast each other.

Logics mixing

Even if arguing that the societal security logic (SSL) has a hegemonic status in relation to the social care logic (SCL) and other logics that might exists, the most common situation is that logics mix in everyday life. Certainly, this comes as no surprise for most people involved in CVE efforts. However, the question of how and when they mix in CVE efforts remains partly unanswered. In figure 2, we mapped out the potential institutional elements (goals, strategies, ground for attention, ground for authority) were the SSL and SCL (see previous part) compete and mix. We will provide a few empirical examples of how these logics mix in multiagency CVE efforts.

The recommended practices in the CVE policies show a strong emphasis on conversational techniques and building positive relationships with local communities and young people. For instance, in Denmark the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have published a handbook for relational work and mentoring in CVE, and in the Norwegian SaLTo handbook, conversation intervention, mediation and reconciliation are considered to be relevant tools and seem typical for the SCL. In Denmark and Norway in particular, such practices are to be used by the police. By contrast, we also see how schools and other educational institutions are to (1) continue with business as usual, for example teaching, developing democracy and safeguarding their pupils and (2) making risk assessments and identifying individuals at risk of radicalization in their own classrooms. The latter task is a new one, deriving from the SSL, and given to schools and educational services and reflects both the goals for the SCL (business as usual) and the SSL (detect potential threats). We can also see the potential for conflicts based on the distinctive goals for each logic in such cases: police wanting information in order to protect public security, while teachers want to protect the privacy of their pupils. In practical multiagency collaboration, teachers and youth workers may have other roles in CVE efforts, such as the ones that most often entail a social relationship with
the young individual. This may mean that these SCL relationships are activated to facilitate SSL intervention and actions.

In Norway, the SLT-coordinators have a key position in aligning different levels of actors in the municipalities and come from different backgrounds and positions within municipal organizations. Their main function is to coordinate and facilitate the work being done in the operational SLT-teams in order to prevent crime. The coordinator position has been described as primarily administrative (PHS, 2008). However, its placement between different agencies and organizational levels can be regarded as a hybrid position funded in an amalgamation of SSL and SCL logics. The Norwegian police have also established a special, personalized function, the Radicalization Contact (Radikaliseringskontakten), in all police territories. As concluded in Section 3.6, this type of function is the hub between different police agencies and the municipalities. However, the radicalization contact is more than a hub for communication and information. Even though their goals are in alignment with the SSL, the radicalization contact engages with young people and individuals of concern using strategies that are found within the SCL, such as conversations when there are concerns about the young person. The case of the radicalization contact shows that even though the police are responsible and the ground for attention and the goals of the CVE efforts rest on an SSL, the strategies used to obtain the goals are typical for the SCL.

The mixing of logics is also apparent in the legal framework around information sharing (see Section 5.4). All countries have an SCL embedded in their restrictions on information sharing which focus on care for the individual’s right to privacy. But we have also shown how these restrictions can be overridden in cases where lives, health and public security may be at risk – goals of value for the SSL. This serves as a prominent example of how the SCL and SSL mix in legal frameworks and become situation-dependent. We also see how logics can be supported by the legal frameworks. Most prominently, §115 in the Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven) in Denmark provides rather extensive freedom for government agencies to share information about individuals for crime prevention purposes and thus reflects the goals of the SSL rather than the SCL. In Sweden, it is the other way around. The strong emphasis on social services as
responsible for dealing with all individuals of concern and the heavy restrictions on sharing information with other agencies, e.g. the Police, possibly reinforce the SCL.

In the other Nordic countries, the social services are given less attention in policy. They are sometimes given the task of identifying individuals at risk and reporting them to the police. Even if there is a general understanding that secrecy should be respected, all the Nordic countries have policies partly advocating for information sharing practices to be utilized in CVE efforts. Amongst others, Herz (2016) highlights the contradictory tasks this results in for social workers as they (1) are to report individuals at risk of radicalization to the security services, and (2) are supposed to support those who wish to leave violent extremist milieus.

### 7.2 Producing Subjects and Objects

The explanatory factors and root causes and processes that are believed to ignite and drive radicalization often originate from individual grievances and risk factors (Sedgwick 2010; Kundnani 2012; Andersson Malmros, 2019). When placing the problem of radicalization and extremism within the scope of multiagency models designed for crime prevention and the safeguarding of young individuals, the problem is also individualized. The potential problem with such individualization is that it becomes depoliticized (see also, Hemmingsen 2015; Lindekilde 2015; Herz 2016).

Therefore, we focus on how the policies analysed construct different target groups for CVE efforts. In accordance with Foucault (1986), policies such as regulations and decrees are sites where governmental subjects and objects are produced through problematization; what Bacchi (2012; 2015) would refer to as subjects and objects being spoken into being. For instance, the positioning of the police in policy is (supposedly) transformed and enacted in practice that produces subjects (Ball, 2015). This is also the case for institutional logics.

The institutional objective of the police is to prevent and intervene against violence and crime, hence their target groups are mainly
criminal elements. The assertive position of the criminal political perspective in policies against CVE and in multiagency organizations found in this mapping constructs certain individuals at risk as being potential criminals. When following the What’s the Problem Represented to be (WPR) approach (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016), and asking “who is constructed as the problem” and analysing the documents, the ones who fall outside of what can be described as the “Nordic norm” constitute the main category. This can be found in some of the actions and best practises suggested in policy. For instance, the Swedish police (Polisen, 2017) recommend that the actors involved in intervention and building trust have an interest in other cultures, religion and events in the surrounding world. This interest can be interpreted as facilitators of a common ground, to reach the “others” by having an interest in their culture and religion, supposedly not a Nordic culture or the Christian religion.

The Finnish policies return to aspects of marginalization and exclusion from Finnish society as possible drivers for radicalization that can be countered. There are also several actions in various policies, suggesting the involvement of religious organizations and faith communities, which indicate that the problem of extremism has strong connections with religious practice. Hence, the problematic individuals that might be at risk of radicalization are young, criminal elements of another culture and religion (other than the mainstream Nordic culture and religion). Thus, through CVE policy, the connection between certain individuals and radicalization can be “spoken into being” problematic individuals.

The “problematic individuals” can also be spotted through the involvement of civil society organizations and their potential role for preventing radicalization. In policy, CSOs are framed as important contributors in socially deprived areas and the relatively extensive mentioning of religious organizations and faith communities reinforces the construction of “the other” as the potential threat. However, actions and activities directed by civil society organizations have many benefits for CVE efforts. They can provide arenas for young individuals where investment, obligations and efforts for participation are lower than in the public sector context. They can offer social relationships with peers or adults, positive role models and positive
alternatives to deleterious milieus. Also, their position as voluntary can make them seem more trustworthy than government agencies when it comes to offering support and guidance. In line with the WPR approach (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016), this also indicates that alleged root causes for radicalization are a lack of healthy relationships and role models and that trust is an issue that needs to be considered in preventing radicalization.

In policy, teachers are sometimes positioned as having a certain responsibility to observe, investigate and report at-risk behaviours to the police or to social services. Lindekilde (2012) writes that teachers are seen as “privileged informants”, as they are in daily contact with young people who trust them, which may give them a position that intelligence services can never get access to. Even if the responsibility to keep students safe, and to report if there are signs of concern for a student’s wellbeing is a traditional practice in schools; the observing and potential reporting of individuals at risk of radicalization can be a somewhat new task for school personnel. These are tasks that can produce a surveillance position, or to make use of Foucauldian semantics, such tasks give school personnel a panoptic function where the few watch the many (Foucault, 1977). In turn, such a function can mean that both students and teachers are introduced to new relationships and positions where the observing teachers make students aware of being watched and that their actions can cause unwanted interventions. This can be read as an way in which governmentality works, as by enactment of policy, it produces subjects who are capable of disciplining themselves in a way that is beneficial for the individual as well as for society (Foucault, 1997).

Previous studies have shown that this have been the case when teachers and school personnel are made responsible to observe, detect and report suspicious behaviour. Being aware of their actions being observed and possibly leading to suspicion and intervention, students are reluctant to speak about religion, politics and issues since these have been made into sensitive questions (Kühler & Lindekilde 2012; Kundnani 2015; O’Donnell, 2015). Even if this can be contested and certainly not the case in all schools and circumstances, if such practices create a culture of reluctance, they may cause new and more unequal relations between teachers and students. These forms of “soft
disciplining” can lead to distrust and silencing of issues that students find important in their everyday lives. For now, we leave this issue to future studies within the HEX-NA project.

7.3 Policy Legitimacy and Mutual Trust

We now finally return to the introduction of this report, and the point of departure for the HEX-NA project as a whole, namely the core tenets of the Nordic countries’ governance model: policy legitimacy and mutual trust. According to Taylor and Warburton (2003), legitimacy is connected to generalized assumptions that the actions of a unit are perceived as desirable and appropriate within a social system: “This reminds us not only that legitimacy is something which is bestowed by the external world rather than created by any organization but also that it is culturally embedded” (ibid. p.323). This means that legitimacy is related to accountability, and to trust. Chaskin (2003) defines accountability as the extent to which organizations act and speak in reliance on their stated goals and how they can be held responsible for their actions.

Denmark’s approach for countering extremism is often put forward as a role model for a firm and legitimate way of tackling the issue of CVE. The recent turn in Swedish policies towards a more securitizing stance could be a way to ensure policy legitimacy when the public discourse is calling for more decisive actions. The multiagency approaches for handling extremism can potentially enhance policy legitimacy, provided that actions and objectives are regarded as appropriate and desirable for handling the problem with extremism and radicalization. Of course, this is also the case if multiagency approaches and the utilization of mixed logics can be proven effective for handling extremism. However, there might be some internal institutional conflicts that present obstacles for attaining such legitimacy, especially if there are uncertainties about legal frameworks.

If the hegemonic policing discourse is assumed to be appropriate and successful in handling the problem, it can earn legitimacy and create
trust among citizens. Such trust can be brought into and enrich the multiagency work. On the other hand, the incorporation of a policing discourse in schools and social services might seem inappropriate for the actors involved. This can delegitimize policy and create distrust among the individuals who are affected by the practice. In reference to this, there are reasons to be aware of the need for balancing perspectives and institutional logics.

On this note, it is also relevant to mention civil society organizations and their elevated position in policy as an actor that can provide trust. As much as multiagency work can utilize CSOs in their preventive and intervention efforts, there is a risk that too much tapping into their services can reduce trust and damage sensitive relationships.
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Heierstad (eds.) Forebygging av radikalisering og voldelig ekstremisme: Norske handlemåter i møtet med Terror. Oslo: Gyldendal.


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RAN. (2016). *Ex Post paper. Handbook on How to set up a multiagency structure that includes the health and social care sectors.* Copenhagen: RAN.


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Center mot våldsbejakande extremism. (2018-12-20) Kontaktvägar för stöd mot våldsbejakande extremism [contacts for support against violent extremism] [available 2019-02-06 at https://cve.se/stod.html] (SE)


Regeringen Dk. (2016-10-11). Tidligere handlingsplaner om forebyggelse af ekstremisme og radikalisering
### Appendix 1. Civil Society Organizations in national documents

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<td>SIRI supports the municipalities in their endeavours to involve and mobilise local resources and representatives of civil society. Through a counselling programme and a methodological handbook, the local authorities are offered various concrete methods and models for such collaborations. The purpose is to create constructive environments and help prevent the recruitment of young people into destructive or extremist groups. (DK, 2016, p. 21)</td>
<td>Organizations provide vital services that are key to the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism. It is often the case that those interested in extremist violence and the members of such groups place little trust in the authorities. Therefore, it is often easier for them to turn to services provided by organizations. Organizations have services which help people disengage from violence, they also offer mentoring and other similar services which make it easier to renounce ideals that con-done the use of violence. Organizations also provide an avenue for non-violent social activism. (FI, 2016, p.18).</td>
<td>Voluntary organizations play a key role in the efforts to combat radicalization and extremism. They help in various ways, e.g. by arranging dialogue meetings and seminars for youth, by giving support to youth at risk or by providing advice and guidance to parents who are concerned (NO, 2014, p. 21).</td>
<td>Organizations in the civil society is often the actor that is first to highlight new problems and the first to develop new actions. (Skr. 2014/15:144. p.30). Public services cannot reach out to everyone in a meaningful way, and will not be able to do so without cooperation with civil society. Together with civil society, social services, police, schools and leisure time constitute a collective approach that is crucial in protecting democracy against violent extremism. (SOU 2017:110, p.93).</td>
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